mobilization. Social media in some cases has strengthened, not up-ended this relationship.104 3. The distribution of harm in this system is multi-layered and multi-directional. While journalists and political opponents are silenced, intimidated, coerced and physically threatened by an authoritarian system, the political economy of disinformation sheds new light on the incentive structures that exploit local workers as active agents of disinformation, as well as the psychological harm that this system engenders at increasing scale through “race-to-the-bottom” work arrangements and the emotionally traumatic nature of this work. Case Study 3: Digital hate speech – Intercommunal violence in Myanmar Social media platforms can act to amplify hateful, dangerous speech in fragile contexts —such as Myanmar — where rumors, misinformation and disinformation can play a role in the incitement of intercommunal, electoral or other forms of violence. Extra-factual sources of information contribute to this problem, often amplified by social media. Digital hate speech has driven anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar and been directly implicated in the foment of intercommunal violence. Weaponization via digital hate speech While hate or dangerous speech has traditionally been propagated by traditional media such as radio or television or through in-person gatherings, the rapid proliferation of mobile phones and internet connectivity and the inherent technological and psychological features of social media platforms magnify these risks.105 In today’s digital environment, every individual has the capacity and agency to develop, disseminate and consume potentially fabricated or misleading information on digital platforms with the power to increase communication speed, volume (of output and input), variety (of content), reach and coverage. Social media amplifies hate at scale. Finally, the inherent design of social media begets selective exposure, information bubbles, homogeneous echo-chambers, confirmation bias, and hyper-personalized, hyper-sensory, and hyper-insular information environments that reduce our cognitive capacity to objectively evaluate information.106 Digital hate speech and virulent rumors warrant a unique aggregation of environmental factors, malicious strategies, and inadvertent actions in a logical narrative to know when thresholds for violent conflict are reached. In considering the patterns, conditions, features and drivers above, Mercy Corps, Do No Digital Harm and Peacebuilding have developed a theory of harm: 104 Zeitzoff, 6. 105 Svetoka, 5-6; Brandon Paladino, “Democracy Disconnected: Social Media’s Caustic Influence on Southeast Asia’s Fragile Republics” (Brookings Institute: 2018), 7-8; Eran Fraenkel, “A Critical Analysis of Digital Communications and Conflict Dynamics in Vulnerable Societies” (Internews: 2014), 2, 10-11; Nils Weidmann, “Communication, Technology, and Political Conflict: Introduction” Journal of Peace Research (2015)264; Deen Freelon, “Personalized Information Environments and Their Potential Consequences for Disinformation” in Understanding and Addressing the Disinformation Ecosystem (Annenberg School of Communication: 2017), 38, 60; Norman Vasu, et al, “Fake News: National Security in the Post-Truth Era” (RSIS: 2018),10-11; Gregory Asmolov, “The Disconnective Power of Disinformation Campaigns,” “Contentious Narratives: Digital Technology and the Attack on Liberal Democratic Norms” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 71, No. 1.5 (2018), 32) 106 Padalino; 7-8; Fraenkel 10-11; Freelon, 38. MERCY CORPS The Weaponization of Social Media: How social media can spark violence and what can be done about it 47