5/22/22, 12:03 AM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report | Freedom House 183 The law also contains a variety of vague and overly broad administrative and criminal sanctions for violations, such as running a website without a license. The Telecommunications Law has no specific regulations relating to net neutrality, zero-rating data transmissions by apps or telecommunications providers, or open internet policies. B7 0-4 pts Does the online information landscape lack diversity and reliability? 1/4 The diversity and reliability of information online are significantly restricted. Since February 2021, the vast majority of new information disseminated online has focused on the coup. Much of this information has come from citizen journalists documenting the military’s increasingly violent crackdown and the people’s creative responses. 184 Public demand for information about the coup has simultaneously increased, and media outlets that provide it have garnered greater attention and respect. 185 Fact-checking and verification have become easier on the one hand, due to the number of sources, and more difficult on the other, because journalists cannot easily travel and have no access to official responses from the state. 186 As independent media have become harder to access online, and only the propaganda of statecontrolled media is available on television and radio, false and misleading information about the state’s activities has become more common (see B5). Particularly prevalent rumors on Facebook have addressed the status of detained state counsellor and NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, 187 impending internet shutdowns, 188 bank fraud, 189 the likelihood of violent crackdowns by the military, 190 deepfake technology, 191 and the role of China’s government in supporting the coup. 192 Some false rumors, such as those about Aung San Suu Kyi, have resulted in large public reactions before being dispelled. 193 Unintentional misinformation that reflects poor digital literacy or a lack of available and trustworthy information has spread alongside propaganda and disinformation. The state’s censorship efforts had affected the diversity of online content produced by independent sources in the years prior to the coup. For example, in 2019 the military requested that the media refrain from saying “civil war” when referring to the country’s internal conflicts. 194 In 2017, the government ordered that all media use the term “terrorist” instead of “insurgent” or “militant” when referring to Rohingya rebels. 195 Also in 2017, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) announced that it would end its partnership with MNTV after the network repeatedly pulled BBC programs, apparently for using government-restricted words like “Rohingya,” according to some analysts. 196 In June 2018, US-backed Radio Free Asia (RFA) canceled its partnership with the Democratic Voice of Burma after the government repeatedly attempted to censor the word “Rohingya” on its programs, which aired on state television. 197 RFA, however, reported that it would still cover Myanmar in other formats. 198 The dominance of Facebook as the main channel for internet use in Myanmar has severely undermined TOP diversity of information online, particularly since it has been blocked. The most-visited websites in Myanmar in 2020 were Google, YouTube, and Facebook. 199 However, a staggering 78 percent of users had never used an internet browser or app stores as of 2020, with most users accessing the internet via https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021 15/28