5/22/22, 12:03 AM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report | Freedom House Facebook apps on their mobile phones. 200 The most popular Facebook pages were mostly run by media outlets, some of which were foreign. 201 B8 0-6 pts Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? 2/6 Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 2 because the military erected extreme and varied obstacles to online mobilization in a bid to quash anticoup protests, though users continued their attempts to mobilize using digital tools during parts of the coverage period. The military has tried to significantly impede the people’s ability to associate or assemble in opposition to its seizure of power. On the first day of the coup, the military shut down internet service to prevent the free flow of information. 202 The next day, the nationwide civil disobedience movement was launched by medical workers on Facebook. 203 As the protests and civil disobedience movement grew, the military ordered telecommunications companies to block Facebook and other communications platforms, and when users circumvented those blocks, the military instructed telecommunications companies to shut down the internet entirely for most people (see A3). 204 Despite the restrictions, people continued to use online tools to organize and share information whenever possible. On February 22, a day of extensive protests, three local outlets broadcast 65 live video streams on Facebook. 205 Users have tried a range of tactics to circumvent the military’s blocking efforts; VPNs and secure communications tools have become widespread. The maker of one secure communications app, Bridgify, reported that it was downloaded over a million times in Myanmar within the first two days after the coup. 206 The circumvention app Psiphon was downloaded by nearly two million users during the same period. 207 Users benefited from foreign counterparts’ recommendations regarding applications that allowed them to chat anonymously or bypass censorship, as prodemocracy activists within the multinational grassroots protest movement known as the Milk Tea Alliance shared their knowledge. 208 The three-fingered salute previously used in Thailand—a pillar of the Milk Tea Alliance—to signal opposition to authoritarian rule has become massively prevalent in Myanmar among supporters of the democratic movement, both online and offline. 209 In a related development, support for the rights of Rohingya people has increasingly become a feature of the anticoup protest movement, as evidenced by hundreds of thousands of users posting images of themselves wearing black and holding up the threefinger salute with the hashtag “#Black4Rohingya” in June 2021. 210 The military has tried to disrupt users’ ability to circumvent its digital controls. On March 30, one regional military government ordered telecommunications companies to disclose lists of subscribers in order to identify who still had internet access. 211 A long list of surveillance tools from vendors in countries including Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Israel has been published by activists TOP reviewing government accounts (see C5). 212 The military has also reportedly submitted daily directives to telecommunications companies, each of which names hundreds of IP addresses to be blocked, in an attempt to end the viability of VPN services (see C4). 213 https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021 16/28