5/22/22, 12:03 AM Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report | Freedom House restricted under international human rights standards. 105 Justice for Myanmar, a campaign group that has criticized the military, was blocked in August 2020. 106 In May 2020, Telenor reported that the PTD had issued a directive ordering service providers to block an additional 22 websites that allegedly contributed to “fearmongering” and “misleading” people about COVID-19. 107 Major telecom providers complied with the 2020 blocking orders. Telenor Myanmar initially resisted the blocking of 67 websites for alleged “fake news,” citing the lack of a sufficient legal basis. 108 The provider later complied, however, after meeting with MoTC officials and determining that the “risk involved in not following the directive as regards fake news is likely to have wider implications in terms of servicing the public.” 109 B2 0-4 pts Do state or nonstate actors employ legal, administrative, or other means to force publishers, content hosts, or digital platforms to delete content, particularly material that is protected by international human rights standards? 1/4 Pressure to remove content continued to originate from state and nonstate actors within Myanmar, as well as from outside the country, throughout the coverage period. Since the February 2021 coup, pressure from the military against media outlets, including demands to cease critical coverage and halt the use of words translating to “regime” and “junta” (see B5), has led to the closure of two large media enterprises, with one opting to take down its entire website. 110 It is also believed that officials have pressured detained users to delete their own content while in custody. Separately, content moderation efforts by social media companies like Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok have led to the removal of content that should be protected under international human rights standards (see B3). Prior to the coup, the government employed other channels to pressure social media platforms and users. Officials called for content hosts, notably Facebook but also WhatsApp, to address rampant intolerance, misinformation, and incitement on their platforms. 111 But the government itself had failed to tackle these problems, and individuals linked to the government were often alleged to be responsible for perpetrating them. 112 B3 0-4 pts Do restrictions on the internet and digital content lack transparency, proportionality to the stated aims, or an independent appeals process? 0/4 Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because directives to restrict content were issued en masse without transparency, proportionality, or an avenue for appeal. Since the coup, broad restrictions on digital content have been enforced without transparency and with gross disproportionality. 113 Those who report on the existence of such restrictions have been threatened with severe consequences. 114 TOP Though the government vaguely described the aims of its restrictions before the coup, the military junta has generally not. The Telecommunications Law includes a broad provision giving the MoTC absolute authority to temporarily block and filter content “for the benefit of the people,” although this power was https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2021 10/28