M.MAS 7/22/15 U Zaw Aye Maung’s statement is telling because it illustrated a conception of victim and violator that is diametrically opposed to the one made visible in international discourse. There are, of course, many conceptions of religious conflict in Myanmar,10 but while U Zaw Aye Maung’s statement appears extreme in comparison to international discourses, in the domestic context this is not the case.11 ‘Fear is not just on the side of the Muslims, but on the side of the Buddhists as well,’ Daw Aung San Suu Kyi explained to the BBC in October 2013. ‘There’s a perception that Muslim power, global Muslim power, is very great.’12 These perceptions are reflected in the rhetoric of public figures and Buddhist leaders from groups including the ‘969 movement’ and Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion (colloquially known by its Burmese acronym ‘Ma Ba Tha’). These groups have risen to prominence within the last three years as they have mobilized to project an existential threat, in which Buddhism is vulnerable and needing protection lest it be supplanted by Islam as the majority religion in Myanmar.13 Internationally, the most extreme examples of their speech have attracted media attention, including references to Muslims as ‘rabid dogs’ and invasive species.14 Domestically, they have established themselves as forces with clear and powerful social and political influence.15 Yet, these narratives of threat and self-defence are emergent works in progress, as are the groups seeking to produce them. The widespread popularity of groups like 969 and Ma Ba Tha may be inferred from 10 Including those that would not accept defining it as a religious conflict. Two months later, for example, the central-government appointed minister for Rakhine State justified movement restrictions imposed on Rohingya by saying, ‘There has been communal violence in the state. Not just 2012 but in 1942 they had carried out a genocide in north Rakhine and an entire village was wiped out. Over 2,000 Rakhine people, including old men and women as well as children, were killed. The people of Rakhine continue to be afraid of them. They run away from them whenever they see them.’ See, “‘There’s No Persecution, Just That Govt Will Not Use Rohingya In Official National Documents’,” Outlook India, July 13, 2015, http://www.outlookindia.com/article/theres-no-persecution-just-that-govt-will-not-use-rohingya-in-official-nationaldocuments/294782. 12 “Suu Kyi Blames Burma Violence on ‘Climate of Fear’,” BBC News, October 24, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24651359. 13 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “Securitization and Islamophobia Analysis of the 969 Movement in Myanmar” (Islam, Law and the State in Myanmar, Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University Singapore, 2014); Kyaw San Wai, “Myanmar’s Religious Violence: A Buddhist ‘Siege Mentality” at Work,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries No. 037/2014 (February 20, 2014); Matthew J Walton and Susan Hayward, Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar, Policy Studies (Southeast Asia), No. 71 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2014), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/contesting-buddhist-narratives-democratization-nationalism-andcommunal-violence-in-mya. 14 TIME magazine, for example, ran a cover story in 2013 featuring one leader, labelling him ‘the face of Buddhist terror.’ See, Hannah Beech, “The Face of Buddhist Terror,” Time Magazine, July 1, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2146000,00.html. 15 Their iconography is readily visible across Myanmar; they have been able to successfully influence lawmaking, winning passage through parliament of the first of a package of four ‘race and religion protection’ laws for which they also garnered millions of signatures, though that rights groups have warned they are discriminatory and violate international human rights standards; and they have participated in, organized, or supported vocal demonstrations in Yangon, Mandalay, and Sittwe supporting their proposed legislative agenda and opposing ‘biased,’ ‘pro-Muslim’ or ‘pro-Rohingya’ activities by the UN, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and international non-governmental organizations. Most recently, they seem to have almost instantaneously put a halt to several development projects planned in the vicinity of the revered Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon, threatening massive protests and, at least according to one report, receiving a promise from military representatives that the projects would be halted or substantially altered. See, Lawi Weng, “Myanmar Military Promises Yangon Highrises ‘Will Be Stopped’: Nationalist Group,” The Irrawaddy, June 22, 2015, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/military-promises-shwedagonhighrises-will-be-stopped-ma-ba-tha.html. 11 2