Where a business enterprise contributes or may contribute to an adverse human rights impact, it should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest extent possible.30 a. Failure to identify potential adverse human rights impacts Facebook’s popularity in Myanmar grew upon the deregulation of Myanmar’s Telecommunications sector in 2013, after decades of oppressive military rule.31 The Complainants are not aware of any due diligence Facebook conducted prior to entering the telecommunications market in Myanmar. The only due-diligence conducted by Facebook of which the Complainants are aware is a Human Rights Impact Assessment (“HRIA”) it commissioned after the 2017 operations and the publication of the IIFFMM Report in October 2018. The Complainants contend that had a baseline assessment – such as that contained in the HRIA – been conducted, Facebook would have identified clear human rights risks that could be exacerbated by its product and services. Myanmar has a well-documented history of brutal militarised oppression of dissenters and political opponents, as well as state-sanctioned persecution and violence meted out against numerous ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya. The persecution of ethnic minorities at the hands of the Tatmadaw was well documented by United Nations human rights bodies and civil society organisations since as early as the 1980s. In 1982, the Myanmar Government stripped the vast majority Rohingya of their citizenship status through a particularly stringent citizenship test.32 Rohingya people experienced ‘violent attacks in 1978, 1991-1992, and again in 2016.’33 Further, as highlighted by the IIFFMM, the domestic legal framework in Myanmar was characterised by a series of problematic laws which were used to silence activists, opposition leaders, and civil society actors.34 A baseline assessment would have identified how the Tatmadaw used oppressive legislation to control the information landscape, and the risks of the social media platform being used as a further tool of suppression.35 As stated in a report conducted by the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Law School: 30 OECD Guidelines, Commentary on Chapter II General Policies at para 19. See Mark Latanero and Aaina Agarwal Carr Centre Discussion Paper, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessment for AI: Learning from Facebook’s Failure in Myanmar’ “Carr Report”, March 19 2021, p 5; see also, Steve Stecklow, ‘Why Facebook is losing the war on hate speech in Myanmar’, Reuters, 15 August 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/>. [accessed 1 August 2018] 32 Burma Citizenship Law 1982, arts 1-8, viewed 12 May 2021, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f71b.html>; ‘III. Discrimination in Arakan’, Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm00502.htm#:~:text=Provisions%20in%20the%201982%20law,three%20types%20of%20Burmese%20citizenship.> [accessed 12 May 2021]; Andrew Selth, ‘The Rohingya crisis and Myanmar’s military responses’, Lowy Institute, 24 November 2017, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rohingyas-and-politico-militarystrategies>. [accessed 15 May 2021] 33 ‘Rohingya refugee crisis’, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, <https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis>. [accessed 15 May 2021] 34 IIFFMM, paras 1294 to 1295, cited in Carr Report p 6. 35 See Mark Latanero and Aaina Agarwal Carr Centre Discussion Paper, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessment for AI: Learning from Facebook’s Failure in Myanmar’, March 19 2021, p 6. 31 9