Limited protection against low-tech surveillance Digital security practices become almost irrelevant when a journalist is under direct threat, such as entering an army checkpoint or facing an imminent house search with military vehicles approaching. Preparations make all the difference. However, once in direct physical contact with adversaries or military personnel, journalists can only do as they are instructed. In cases of surveillance, when neighbours, friends, or family report journalists’ activities to the authorities, digital security is also of limited use. As reported by our respondents, keeping a low profile, not carrying laptops or cameras, not disclosing any work activities, and managing separate social media accounts depicting a ‘normal’ life are more efficient mitigation strategies. As previously noted, although some digital security training recommends maintaining two separate phones to facilitate blending in, our informants find it infeasible to leave their primary phone behind, particularly when travelling and for some, obtaining a second device is financially out of reach. Identity papers Expired passports are hard to renew for journalists on the radar of military authorities. Additionally, older official documents on which a journalist’s profession is exposed form a risk. Occupation records are shown on National ID cards and being listed as a journalist adds considerable risk while travelling, or during a surprise check. Mismatch between digital security training design with the needs in the field Current digital security training curricula do not meet the demands of journalists in the field. Typically, these programs concentrate on three areas: (1) encryption and device protection; (2) the complete migration to secure communication channels; and (3) individual technological diligence. Although these are important, they overlook the low-tech, physical security risks that journalists in Myanmar frequently encounter. 46