This has resulted in a situation where journalists who are capable of applying digital security tools effectively refuse to use them, as they deem them useless in their particular situation. Password protection will just make the arrested person get hit more. As you know one cannot be stubborn and refuse to open (#6). I was arrested at the airport. They took my phones and computers. They asked me to open the password for the phone and laptop (#7). Two journalists (#2, #4) also associated the ineffectiveness of standard digital security training with the suddenness of high-risk situations. If the military is approaching and there are only a few minutes to prepare, it is too late to practise digital security. Arguably digital security tools can still be effective, but stress management needs to be taken into account when transferring these skills to journalists. Digital security experts may need to adjust their training in the specific context of Myanmar journalists. DS Trainer #2 explains that journalists “mainly use a physical approach,” such as destroying USB ports without damaging the data or hiding their phones in a tactically placed rice barrel. Such a measure is faster and requires journalists to be tactful about their physical surroundings; however, these physical mitigation measures are not yet widely incorporated into digital security training. 33