The everyday threats the journalists encounter are thus rudimentary, often revolving around analogue methods like the manual checking of phones and the use of a list of individuals marked for detention. As Journalist #2 says: No one is using advanced devices like Cellebrite or software to inspect everyone's phones and devices at the airport. However, they do maintain a list of individuals they intend to apprehend at airport immigration. If they identify such a person, they would detain them and escort them to a room for interrogation and device inspection. The list of types of people that can be detained at the airport includes CDMers (Civil Disobedience Movement), medical staff [like] doctors [and] nurses, and teachers. Similarly, #6 said: They do have the technology, they probably bought it from Israel or Iran. [...] I think they probably have the technology, but they can only station it at certain important locations. I don't think they have many technicians who can use those complex technologies. I also think they target revolutionaries instead of journalists, but journalists will also get caught. The use of digitally secure apps, a common practice recommended in digital security training, ironically poses a significant risk during travel. Journalists (#1, #6, and #8) report that measures like installing Signal, VPN, or using password protection and encryption are prone to be easily spotted by military personnel and may invite unwanted scrutiny. When phones are checked, the presence of protection often leads 7 to more probing questions. Journalist #8, who was once stopped on their way to the Thai border, observes: 7. Although some digital security protocols suggest using two separate phones to aid in blending in, our informants often find it impractical to leave their primary phone behind, and not all have the means to afford a secondary device. 25