that another wave of student-led popular uprisings would occur and threaten the militarystate apparatus. Other civilian institutions were relocated to remote areas, all of which provided minimal public transportation for attendees or opportunities to associate with downtown Rangoon residents, and it had explosive consequences in 1988 (Seekins, 2005). The remoteness of these campuses and the difficult commutes to and from the center of the city not only cut student access to the residents of Rangoon, but it also undermined a sense of unity among students thereby ensuring that no genuine student solidarity or organizing could develop, thereby diminishing threats of another rebellion. Much like the forced relocations to outskirt townships, the state realized that an isolated and disorganized population is much less likely to organize a comprehensive threat (Seekins, 2011). The military’s use of Aung San and his legacy is also of critical importance when examining control mechanisms. When Ne Win first began his campaign to gain support and legitimacy he was eager to align himself with Aung San, claiming that he and the Tatmadaw were the rightful successors to the late figurehead. Aung San was designated the original father of Burmese Socialism and hailed as a national hero. Following the Four Eights uprising, it became clear that socialism was not sustainable in Burma and the ruling elite needed a new way to justify its perpetuity. The state began a campaign of “Aung San amnesia” (Houtman, 1999) in an attempt to broaden public acceptance of Tatmadaw political supremacy. As Houtman explains, the Tatmadaw had to reinvent a political ideology that would better substantiate its cardinal role in Burmese politics (pp. 15-17). 41