primary purpose was to garner popular support for the government (Thwin & Thwin, 2013). It represented an early attempt by high-ranking Burmese officials to safeguard their positions and avoid situations in which their personal power or the military’s institutional power could be weakened. As a result, Ne Win’s power went unchallenged and his legitimacy grew as he presented himself as the rightful successor of national hero Aung San (Seekins, 2011). Within the BSPP or the Burmese military, promotions depended on loyalty to Ne Win and the overall government apparatus rather than merit or talent (Seekins, 2011). This tactic allowed the top echelon of Burmese government to maintain systemic order and circumvent any possible internal plans to overthrow the regime like Ne Win had facilitated in 1962. Anyone considered too smart or too popular among the civilian population was purged to ensure that Ne Win’s power was unchallenged. During this time, the government was entirely autocratic, despite claims that it represented all working Burmese people (Taylor, 2009). Dependent on the whim of one leader, the army-party-state hierarchy was yet another measure to ensure total military and state supremacy. It must be said, however, that there was a legitimate aspect of this standard. Seekins (2011) notes that due to the fact that as a nation Burma had weak institutions save for the army itself, which performed well on the battlefield against communist and ethnic insurgents but failed miserably when it tried to run the economy or gain the allegiance and cooperation of the population of central Burma, mostly through mass mobilization campaigns similar to the Bogyoke government-era “Sweat Scheme.” (p. 94) The military backed the BSPP as an organization for mass mobilization, establishing a pattern that continued throughout the SLORC/SPDC era and into the present day. In fact Ne Win’s successor, Senior General Than Shwe, encountered the 28