the facade of a return to limited democracy. The Constitution also perpetuated the regime’s restrictive approach to citizenship by largely retaining restrictions established by the 1974 Constitution and the 1982 Citizenship Law. With increased international pressure following the catastrophe of Cyclone Nargis, the SPDC announced that it would hold general elections—the first in two decades—in the fall of 2010. Just days prior to the elections, the regime also released Suu Kyi from house arrest, where she had been held for most of the time since the previous elections. The NLD boycotted the elections, protesting that they would not be fair and free, and it remained allied with the Sangha. Ultimately the military’s new “civilian wing,” the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won, propelling former military general Thein Sein into the spotlight as the nation’s new “democratically elected” president. It is particularly noteworthy that during this period, persecution of the Rohingya continued and ethnic tensions in Arakan (now officially called Rakhine State) were increasingly exploited as political tools. On a national scale the Tatmadaw increasingly supported a rhetoric of Buddhist Burmese nationalism, further alienating the Rohingya and many other non-Buddhist groups. Out this resurrected definition of national identity, movements such as 969 and MaBaTha coalesced with the assistance of radicalized monks such as Ashin Wirathu and Sitagu Sayadaw. This created a veneer of national solidarity which the Tatmadaw later exploited to garner support from the general public. Also at this time, the political focus shifted toward integration of the Tatmadaw, the newly empowered USDP, and the NLD. 18

Select target paragraph3