Chapter V Ceasefire Agreements and the Perpetuation of a Military-Oriented State Not unlike other actions taken by individual military officials and the Tatmadaw as an institution, the development of ceasefire agreements with Burma’s various armed ethnic organizations is underpinned by political and economic motivations. It can be summarized thus: the military engages in ceasefire negotiations when it is beneficial to do so. Following the 1990s ceasefire agreement, the Burmese military government legalized all forms of cross-border trade with China, Thailand, and India with the stipulation that Tatmadaw checkpoints be established to collect taxes for the central government (and therefore, top military generals) (Felbab-Brown, 2017). As FelbabBrown note, this strategy is named ‘ceasefire capitalism’ and they explain: “The Burmese regime allocates land concessions in ceasefire zones as an explicit postwar military strategy to govern land and populations to produce regulated, legible, militarized territory” (Felbab-Brown, 2017, p. 747). Under direct military rule even small and seemingly pro-democracy actions initiated and undertaken by the Tatmadaw still contained a strategic element of control. It is evident that the Tatmadaw’s interest in achieving communal peace was not driven by a genuine desire to secure safety and stability for Burma’s various ethnic groups. On the contrary, economic and political incentives were abundant. In reluctantly allowing various ethnic organizations to continue trade in their respective territories, the Tatmadaw