the father of Burmese socialism (Houtman, 1999). Furthermore, the military decided that more money could be made in a free market economy (Lintner, 2009). The Burmese economy, referred to as the Burmese Way to Capitalism, at its conception and in its present-day form, is a military-dominated economy. Following the collapse of socialist and communist states worldwide at the end of the Cold War, a socialist economy was no longer a viable option for the Burmese military, particularly from a global standpoint. Instead, it turned to what was termed a “disciplined democracy” with a capitalist economic design in order to maximize its prominence in Burmese society. In reality, Ne Win and the BSPP had a covert aim to centralize the economy so the Tatmadaw could exercise control either directly or indirectly through militaryaffiliated businesses (Houtman, 1999). At this time it also became clear that isolationism was less advantageous than previously established. Under the SLORC regime (late 1980s and early 1990s), China had been Burma’s sole international business and economic partner. In the years leading up to Burma’s so-called “transition,” the military-state became acutely aware of the disadvantages of relying on a single source of trade and foreign direct investment. Like the SLORC regime’s abandonment of socialism for capitalism, the SPDC began to step further away from isolationism in order to reap the benefits of an open domestic market that participated in the global economy. The centralized Burmese state created more personal autonomy and greater economic advantages, but the distribution of those opportunities was far from uniform given the 20 years of international economic sanctions as well as mismanagement by the central government. Military holding companies—crucial actors economically and 44