established under the SLORC disregard the livelihoods of the general public if it is beneficial to the military and government to do so. The new town of Shwepyithar, established in 1990, is another example of the relocation tactic continually used by the military-state to secure development or economic gains: Shwepyithar . . . consisted of paddy land that was confiscated by the SLORC from farmers, who were then obliged to hand over kyats 1,500 to build new houses on land they had originally owned. At the same time poor city people were being forced to relocate to the area from downtown, as authorities determined that the land their houses stood on was needed for construction of new highways, buildings, and markets. (Seekins, 2005, p. 266) Seekins goes on to explain that neither the farmers nor the urban poor were compensated in any form for their troubles in this “exercise in military-style eminent domain” (2005, p. 266). Many residents of Shwepyithar fell into debt after borrowing from lenders with extremely high interest rates. Furthermore, the remoteness of these peripheral townships required extensive public transportation to reach their jobs or even to work in the city center. It should also be noted that while the new towns were essentially dumping grounds for those the military-state deemed undesirable or those it needed to physically move for the sake of development objectives, they were also home to so-called VIP Wards — areas designated for military and government officials as well as some civil servants (Seekins, 2011). This supports the theory that the primary concern of Burma’s top officials revolved around maintaining Tatmadaw longevity and the personal ambitions of the nation’s most powerful individuals. Under the guise of social welfare, the military-state was able to clear regions for economic and infrastructure development 34