to the safety and stability of the nation and Buddhism, which enabled intensified discriminatory sentiment against Muslims in general. Conversations being held currently, regarding the crisis in Rakhine and Burma’s supposed democratic transition, fail to connect the dots between the above contributing components and the underlying psychology of the military. The current constitution in Burma was written in 2008 under the State Peace and Development Council. It offers a legitimizing tool for continued Tatmadaw dominance under the guise of democratic reform. Many Burma watchers and international media outlets have been swift to claim that Aung San Suu Kyi has “fallen from grace” and allowed Rohingya genocides to continue. What is missing from this understanding of Burma’s present political climate is the fact that Suu Kyi and her NLD party find themselves forced to work within the framework of a constitution that is not democratic and was drafted by leading Tatmadaw officials in order to establish their claim to power. The general consensus among Burma watchers and scholars of international relations is that since the 2010 general elections, Burma has been on a path to some form of democracy. The fact that Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have been allowed to actively participate in government affairs is a step on the road to a democratic Burma. However, I suggest that this disciplined democracy is part of the Tatmadaw’s broader scheme to entrench itself into all aspects of Burmese political and social affairs. As an institution, the Burmese armed forces are incredibly intelligent when it comes to manipulating the national identity of the population and the functioning of its government in pursuit of its unofficial ambitions. In the post-9/11 world, the Burmese military had to 22