This is not a narrowly framed anti-fraud provision. By relying on an undefined and inherently manipulable concept of “false” information, Article 31 creates broad scope for arbitrary enforcement against protected expression. Website and social media blocking powers Building on this vague speech restriction, Articles 14(d) and 14(e) empower the authorities to monitor, close, and block websites and social media accounts based on mere “suspicion” of criminal activity. Article 37 further requires ISPs to proactively block or remove access to any website the regime deems “fraudulent”. Together, these provisions create an open-ended censorship framework capable of further targeting independent media, mutual aid platforms, and other forms of digital dissent. Rather than requiring clear legal thresholds or independent review, the Bill grants sweeping discretion to suppress online content before any wrongdoing has been established. This sharply departs from the principle that restrictions on expression must be exceptional, necessary, and subject to adequate safeguards. Extraterritorial jurisdiction The Bill also extends the military’s repressive framework beyond Myanmar’s territory by explicitly asserting jurisdiction over Myanmar citizens, including diaspora activists, and permanent residents living abroad. This extraterritorial reach enables the military to criminalise, monitor, and prosecute online dissent conducted overseas, including cross-border humanitarian coordination and international advocacy undertaken in response to the crisis in Myanmar. By projecting vague cybercrime provisions across borders, the Bill seeks to chill protected expression and association not only inside the country but also among communities abroad who document abuses, support resistance networks, or mobilise international attention. International legal assessment International human rights law requires restrictions on expression to be clearly and narrowly formulated so that individuals can regulate their conduct accordingly (ICCPR, Article 19; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34). Terms such as “false” information are inherently broad and highly vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation, particularly in a context where the State itself is the principal source of repression and disinformation. The Bill fails that standard. Rather than addressing cyber-enabled fraud through precise and proportionate measures, it equips the military with a legal basis to criminalise contested speech, censor digital platforms on suspicion alone, and extend repression to critics and activists abroad. In the context of Myanmar’s ongoing conflict, these provisions operate not as legitimate regulation but as tools to dismantle digital political opposition, punish reporting on military abuses, and obstruct online humanitarian and advocacy efforts.