A/HRC/39/CRP.2 The Mission was also able to corroborate that, after the civilians escaped their detention on 4 December 2016, Tatmadaw soldiers intentionally burned several nearby villages. 700 321. During the period of conflict, the Tatmadaw launched airstrikes on and fired into Monekoe and nearby villages, destroying civilian property as well as a church, and in at least one instance causing civilian deaths. 701 One victim reported that in early November 2016, while fighting the MNDAA, the Tatmadaw fired artillery shells at her village, one of which hit her house. Two other villagers were killed in the shelling and children injured.702 After the artillery attack, the Tatmadaw entered the village, took the food rations and livestock. Her family fled to China and later returned but soldiers prohibited them from returning to their village. She told the Mission, “losing my home means we are in a dire economic condition. The attack has traumatised me and my children and changed our lives forever.”703 322. The fighting displaced an estimated 20,000 people, forcing many of them close to the border or into China.704 The area was under a state of lockdown that prevented humanitarian assistance from reaching some displaced in need;705 and credible reports indicate a local aid worker was injured attempting to reach the displaced population. 706 323. The Tatmadaw regained control of Monekoe town in early December 2016. Displaced individuals who returned to the town and area were photographed and issued with a whitecoloured card.707 These cards had to be shown at all times, including when going to cut firewood or to farmland. 708 Credible reports received by the Mission describe that soldiers would frequently check houses to confirm the number of people present and keep family photographs in front of houses to allow for surprise checks. 709 Individuals returning to Monekoe were in need of food and shelter assistance as houses had been burned, but access was limited to those holding these white cards, preventing humanitarian agencies from providing assistance.710 B. Patterns of violations and abuses committed by non-State armed actors 324. The denial of access to the country and the refusal of the Myanmar authorities to respond to the Mission’s requests for information have greatly limited the ability of the Mission to gather first-hand information on violations and abuses perpetrated by EAOs. Consequently, the Mission had to draw more from secondary sources, with the methodological challenges this entails. The sample of cases reported and verified by the Mission may not be fully representative of the overall, highly complex situation. Nevertheless, the Mission has a reliable, but limited body of information suggesting that most EAOs711 fighting in Kachin and Shan States, to differing extents, have committed international humanitarian law violations and human rights abuses. 325. The information received by the Mission suggests that violations and abuses committed by EAOs occur on a lesser scale than those committed by the Tatmadaw. 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 82 DI-058, K-133.4, K-133.6, K-133.15, K-133.22, K-133.23. K-133.9, K-133.10, K-133.11, K-133.13, K-133.14, K-133.17, PI-042, SM-001, V-056. The Mission does not have sufficient information to ascertain whether these attacks were directed at a legitimate target and/or adequate precautions were taken. PI-042. K-142.40. K-069.4, K-069.5. K-069.5. K-142.41, QI-082. DI-058, V-056. K-.133.6, K-142.48, PI-041. K-142.48, QI-082. These include TNLA, KIA, SSA-S, MNDAA, and AA. In some instances the Mission was not able to identify which Shan State Army (SSA) committed the violations, either the SSA-S or the SSA-N. The Mission received extremely limited information pertaining to the United Wa State Army (UWSA).