A/HRC/39/CRP.2 making any efforts to establish this ahead of initiating the attack or further assessing it in the course of the attack. This is in violation of the rule that parties to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives. 175 During subsequent operations in villages and towns, the Tatmadaw did also not attempt to distinguish civilians from military objectives. Such indiscriminate attacks resulted in civilian men, women and children being injured or killed, with large numbers of civilians being driven away from their homes and villages.176 127. In many attacks reported, the Tatmadaw did not have a specific military objective when targeting the villages. Sources informed the Mission that, in many cases, the EAOs’ posts or bases were located far outside the villages under attack. 177 For example, a witness stated that the Tatmadaw had fired mortar shells at Gar Yar Yang village in Mansi Township, Kachin State, in February 2013. He stated that there was no KIA base near the village, that there was no fighting with the KIA or efforts on the part of the Tatmadaw to target members of the KIA: they merely shot at the villagers. 178 As a further example, Nam Ha village in Muse Township, Shan State, was reported to have been attacked on or around 14 December 2016, both by mortar shelling and airstrikes by four jet fighter planes. The village was composed of nearly a hundred households and had a population of over 500 villagers, with no members of EAOs present during the attacks and with no other military assets in the village: “There were no rebels in my village. But the army just came and attacked the people.”179 128. Information therefore strongly indicates that airstrikes and shelling were used indiscriminately as a more general tactic in the context of “clearance operations”, in essence attacking the civilian population as a whole as opposed to being used against specifically identified military targets.180 Failure to take requisite precaution in attacks 129. Even in cases where information indicates that the Tatmadaw attack was in pursuit of a specific military objective, for example, the capture or weakening of an EAO’s base, the attack often still failed to respect the principles of precaution. 181 This is especially the case when the attack occurred in densely populated civilian areas. Attacks were launched which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of the three, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 130. For example, on the morning of 14 January 2013, two artillery rounds landed near the centre of the city of Laiza in Kachin State, killing three civilians, all of whom were men. 182 While the KIA headquarters are located in Laiza, a city densely populated by civilians, there was no apparent specific military objective near where the shells impacted. The Tatmadaw fired artillery from Hkang Hkai Bum military base, with the first round landing in front of a civilian home, killing two civilians and injuring others. The second round of artillery landed in front of another house close to the first, killing a child. In addition to the three persons killed, at least four civilians were injured in the incident, including two women and two children. A witness mentioned that the shrapnel hit one of the children, a young girl, and that she was paralysed as a consequence.183 Credible information received indicates that the round impacted near a busy street, deflecting most of the blast towards the house, and away from the many people walking on the sidewalks nearby.184 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 ICRC/Customary IHL, rule 16. DI-057, DI-066, PI-043, PI-044, PI-049, PI-050, PI-053, PI-065, PI-074, PI-087, PI-101. DI-057, PI-026, PI-073, PI-101 PI-026. DI-057. See this chapter, section A.8: Emblematic incidents (Tanai). DI-066, PI-024, PI-026, PI-050, PI-054, PI-065, PI-072. K-136, SI-002, V-096. SI-002. K-136, SI-002, V-096. 35