A/HRC/39/CRP.2 considers that the anti-United Nations climate actively fostered by the Myanmar authorities has contributed to this situation. 3. Curtailment of peaceful protests 1300. The Mission corroborated cases of excessive use of force in the management of protests and demonstrations, and prosecution of participants in protests and demonstrations, curtailing the right to peaceful assembly. A notable case is the shooting of protesters by the police in Mrauk-U in January 2018.2870 In another recent example, individuals holding peace protests in late April and May 2018, in several cities including Myitkyina, Bago, Mandalay and Yangon, in solidarity with internally displaced persons trapped in Kachin State, have been charged under the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Act.2871 In Yangon, protestors were also beaten. One participant told the Mission: On 12 May 2018, we started to march and sing songs but police with water cannons blocked our way. The police said they had an order to block the march. We had decided to end the march when the police started to beat up protestors. There were also plainclothes individuals present who were not police but working alongside them. The police arrested nine people, including some protestors and some passers-by. Now, 17 people have been charged.2872 1301. Considering these, together with other credible reports of similar instances 2873, the Mission concludes that there is a pattern of using excessive force in the management of protests and demonstrations and prosecuting participants, with the purpose or effect of silencing critical voices. B. The issue of “hate speech” 1302. Anti-Rohingya and broader anti-Muslim sentiment, including “hate speech”, is widely prevalent in Myanmar, even in the most progressive pro-democracy circles. As discussed above2874, in relation to the 2012 violence in Rakhine State, a campaign of hate and dehumanisation of the Rohingya had been underway for months prior to the violence. This campaign was led by the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP), various ethnic Rakhine organizations, radical Buddhist monk organizations (including the 969 group), several officials and influential figures. 1303. Virulent hate speech against the Rohingya, and Muslims in general, has not stopped since then.2875 On the contrary, it has intensified. While messages of hatred are propagated by a multitude of actors, it is commonly recognised that ultranationalist elements within the Buddhist monkhood are the most active, well-resourced and effective in this regard. This includes the 969 movement, created in 2012, and the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion (known as MaBaTha), which emerged in 2014. High-profile monks, including Wirathu, Parmaukkha and Sitagu Sayadaw, have openly and actively espoused and promoted anti-Muslim narratives for many years. 2870 2871 2872 2873 2874 2875 320 See chapter V, section A.5: Emblematic incident: shooting in Mrauk-U on 16 January 2018. See also Progressive Voice, “Time to Hear Our Voices – Freedom of Assembly and the Youth Peace Movement in Myanmar”, July 2018. PI-102. E.g. A/HRC/22/58, para. 30; A/HRC/25/64, para. 28; A/HRC/28/72, paras. 19, 50; A/61/311, para. 35. Also PI-048. See chapter V, section C.5: Violence in 2012, Spreading hate. Several reports have also drawn attention to “hate speech” targeting other segments of the population, such as other ethnic or religious minority groups, women, and politicians. See e.g. Pen Myanmar, “Hate Speech: A Study of Print, Movies, Songs and Social Media in Myanmar” (2015); Institute for War and Peace Reporting, “No Hate Speech Project” (2017): https://www.facebook.com/NoHateSpeechProject/; see also A/72/382, para. 56. However, in light of the particular scale and intensity of the hate campaigns against Muslims, and Rohingya in particular, the Mission focused its attention on this phenomenon.