A/HRC/39/CRP.2 using hand gestures and wooden models.2323 Other members were provided with basic instructions on self-defence techniques, the use of swords and hand-to-hand combat.2324 1030. ARSA supporters mobilised shortly prior to the 2017 attacks had no training and little information about the group.2325 As one young man explained: I joined ARSA about one or two months before the August 2017 attacks. I didn’t receive any training or weapons. On the night of the attack, I wasn’t informed in advance. I heard gunshots around 1am in the distance. The leader came to my house at around 3:30am and told me to come and fight. But I only had my small tool for digging.2326 1031. One of the goals of the 9 October 2016 attacks was to obtain weapons. 2327 During those attacks, ARSA did obtain a small number of firearms, including from the BGP Headquarters at Kee Kan Pyin (Ta Na Shock), Maungdaw Township.2328 1032. Regardless, in the 2017 attacks, most ARSA members were without firearms, 2329 but equipped with homemade weapons such as sticks, knives, swords and slings-shots and some homemade explosives.2330 Some participants noted that even these types of homemade weapons were difficult to obtain, given the Tatmadaw’s confiscation of knives and other bladed objects from Rohingya households after October 2016. 2331 1033. At the village level, those who were mobilised to participate were reassured that weapons and proper training would be provided at the right moment, although this did not eventuate.2332 One participant stated that ARSA members had said that he and others would be provided with training and weapons: “But all they did was give us a stick and said that we should pretend that it is a weapon. We never got any training or weapons.” 2333 1034. ARSA did have some capacity to produce some crude IEDs 2334 but that capacity is questionable, both in terms of production and execution. 2335 As one ARSA member elaborated, “The IEDs were made locally by members and are not particularly strong. We use them just to scare the military.”2336 In the attack in which he participated, the explosive was not directed at the checkpoint as intended, 2337 and no military casualties were reported. While the Myanmar Government’s list of ARSA attacks mentions the use of IEDs by ARSA, none of the casualties sustained by the Myanmar security forces were reported as having been caused by an IED.2338 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 246 LI-121, QI-102, BM-049. CI-137, CI-140, QI-102, XI-008. CI-141, LI-054, LI-089, LI-121, BM-049, V-075, V-102. LI-054. LI-121, LI-122, XI-008; Facebook posts of Commander in Chief, removed, on file with Mission. LI-121, LI-122, BM-003, Furthermore, according to Government official statements, ARSA looted 65 to 68 firearms and many rounds of ammunitions during the 9 October 2016 attacks, of which 37 were recovered by 16 November 2017; Multiple Facebook Posts of the Commander-In Chief See, removed, on file with Mission. CI-140, LI-089, QI-099, QI-103, XI-007, BM-025. CI-137, CI-140, QI-102, QI-103, XI-007, XI-008. LI-054, See this chapter, section D.2.b: The build-up to 25 August 2017. LI-054, LI-089, CI-137. LI-089. CI-022, CI-137, CI-140, QI-099, XI-007, BM-003. CI-140, V-102. CI-140. CI-140. See the following posts from the Information Committee: “Breaking News 7: After being declared as terrorist group, extremist terrorists continue making violent attacks” (Facebook Post, 26 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786695324836909; “Breaking News 8: Extremist terrorists continue carrying out violent attacks (Facebook Post, 26 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786222098217565; “Breaking News 10: Terrorists trying to destroy Maungtaw” (Facebook post, 27 August 2017), https://www.facebook.com/InfomationCommittee/posts/786691611503947; “Breaking News 12: