A/HRC/39/CRP.2 Similarities with other anti-Muslim violence elsewhere 741. Myanmar experienced other waves of anti-Muslim violence beyond Rakhine State in 2013 and 2014 and included the destruction or burning of mosques. Incidents were reported in the following locations: Yangon town (February 2013), Mandalay and Bago Divisions (March 2013), Oakkan in Yangon Division (April-May 2013), Hpakant in Kachin State (May 2013), Lashio in Shan State (May 2013), Mone in Bago Division (May 2013) and Mandalay town (July 2014).1605 742. The Mission did not investigate these incidents. However, given their relevance in understanding the overall dynamics at play in Myanmar in anti-Muslim violence, it examined credible accounts that indicate many of these incidents were pre-planned and instigated, following a similar pattern.1606 There was often an allegation of rape or another crime by a Muslim perpetrator against a Buddhist victim, which was quickly spread by 969, whether true or not. Then a public rally was held, aimed at spreading hatred and inciting violence against Muslims. Credible information indicates that almost every major outbreak of communal violence since October 2012 was preceded by a 969-sponsored preaching tour in the area, usually by Ashin Wirathu himself”.1607 743. In Meiktila, groups of people reportedly went door to door one week before the violence to distribute 969 stickers to Buddhists asking them to put them on their houses to ensure that they would not get burned in the anti-Muslim violence that followed. Monks were allegedly involved in the violence.1608 744. In Mandalay, one Muslim and one Buddhist were killed in riots after a social media post went viral, falsely alleging that two Muslim men had raped a Buddhist woman. Credible reports established that the violence was instigated and perpetrated by outside agitators. The instigation included two fabricated rape allegations made by a Buddhist woman and a Muslim woman, reportedly both hired by the same man. 1609 In March 2015, these two women and three other persons were reportedly convicted and sentenced to 21 years imprisonment under the Emergency Provisions Act and the Penal Code for making false rape allegations.1610 Senior abbots from Mandalay stated in a pubic report that the rioters – some of them allegedly drunk and dressed like monks – visited them at night, trying unsuccessfully to recruit them to take part in the violence. Similarly, Muslim community leaders from Mandalay stated in the same report that unknown people tried similar tactics on them but they also refused to join.1611 The attitude of both Buddhist and Muslim leaders prevented the violence from spreading further. Moreover, the President’s Office reportedly decided to temporarily block access to Facebook in Mandalay to prevent the circulation of the fabricated rape allegations and related information.1612 7. Conclusion 745. The official narrative according to which the 2012 violence was “intercommunal” has prevailed both in Myanmar and internationally. While some human rights organizations, commentators and journalists have questioned it, they remained isolated voices. Regardless of whether it was the intent and purpose from the outset, the Myanmar authorities have used the narrative as a justification to further oppress the Rohingya and the Kaman communities, 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 176 law in Rakhine State: President” (4 October 2013), available at: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs16/NLM-2013-10-04-red.pdf V-049. V-167. V-167. V-049. V-167. The information was first published in the Burmese version of the State-run newspaper, Myanma Alinn Daily (19 March 2015), available at: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/19.Mar_.15_mal.pdf, p.14; K-238. V-167. T. McLaughlin, “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar” (Wired, 6 July 2018).