A/HRC/39/CRP.2 present.2668 In the Pan Kain IDP Camp, the forces gathered villagers in a paddy field.2669 The men and women were separated. Both groups were tied up, beaten, and their valuables stolen.2670 Younger females were taken away,2671 with one witness believing they were taken to the BGP base in a nearby Rakhine village.2672 One mother said some months later that soldiers had taken away her daughter and that she was still missing: I have not seen her since then and I fear that she has been raped, and worse may have happened. I am so worried about my daughter. I am tortured thinking about what might have happened to her.2673 1171. Another woman, who also saw girls and young women being taken away, saw some return. They were in tears, with torn clothing,2674 and they told her that the security forces had “done something bad” to them, but had been told not to talk about it.2675 Based on established patterns of behaviour of the Tatmadaw, it is likely that some or all of these women and girls were subjected to rape, gang rape, or other forms of sexual violence, and some may have been killed.2676 1172. Over these two days, two large groups of more than 50 Rohingya men were beaten, tied up and taken away in military vehicles. When some resisted, the security forces fired shots, killing three Rohingya men. 2677 While some were released the same day, a large group were taken to the Zay Di Pyin BGP base,2678 where they were tortured and ill-treated. One man was killed in detention.2679 The village of Ah Thet Nan Yaar and the Pan Gain IDP Camp were subject to “clearance operations” on 28 August 2017, during which both locations were destroyed by fire.2680 Conclusion 1173. While purportedly to quash ARSA activity, the post-October 2016 period saw the Tatmadaw turn much of northern Rakhine State into a security zone. Oppression against the Rohingya intensified and daily life became untenable. In parallel, inflammatory reporting of the “Bengali terrorist” threat increased, strengthened by vitriolic State-sponsored hate speech and divisive rhetoric from Rakhine politicians and radical Buddhists. Fear was instilled amongst other ethnic communities, inter-communal relations weakened and local militias were strengthened. The weeks leading up to the 25 August 2017 saw multiple warning signs. There was a significant military build-up, with the deployment of LIDs, and a series of events in northern Rathedaung Township that further escalated tensions. An environment was created which both encouraged and enabled the ARSA attacks and the Tatmadaw “clearance operations”. The human rights catastrophe of 2017 was planned, foreseeable and inevitable. 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 2679 2680 LI-037, LI-038, LI-040, QI-010, LM-012, K-063.34. CI-199, LI-037, LI-038, LI-040, QI-031. LI-037, LI-038, LI-040, K-063.34. LI-037, LI-040, V-218. LI-037. LI-040. LI-037. LI-037. See chapter VII, Hallmarks of Tatmadaw operations, section B: Sexual violence. CI-199, LI-038, LI-040, QI-010, QI-031, LM-012, K-063.34. CI-199, LI-038, QI-010, QI-031, K-063.34, V-067. LI-038, V-067. QI-031. 277