launched seems unrealistic at this point. Following the military-dominated elections in 2010, President Thein Sein, a former general, ushered in the liberalisation process through reforms; and it was this process that ultimately led to the NLD’s election victory in 2015. Concurrently, today’s military leadership views Thein Sein’s actions at that time as the reason for the coming to power of the NLD, which it perceives as being antagonistic towards the armed forces. Thus, another liberalisation process initiated by reform-minded former military personnel cannot be expected today. Despite its composition, Myanmar’s new government will be able to maintain a civilian guise, which will facilitate the normalisation of relations at the international level with willing partners. Such a development is not only of interest to the junta but also to neighbouring countries such as India and China, both of which would like to intensify their relations with Myanmar. It was, above all, the Chinese leadership that had urged the junta to hold elections so that an (authoritarian) transition from a military dictatorship to an elected “civilian” government could take place. The end of international isolation Initially, the coup drove Myanmar into international isolation. The military takeover was heavily criticised in the political West, particularly by the US and Europe, and the military government subsequently came under sweeping sanctions. There was also open criticism of the putsch from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to which Myanmar belongs and whose joint meetings the junta was not allowed to attend. Accordingly, neither ASEAN, the EU, the UK, Australia nor the US supported the recent elections in Myanmar, which they branded as not credible. But the international isolation of the coup leadership was limited from the outset. The neighbouring countries of Thailand, India and China were all critical of the instability caused by the coup but did SWP Comment 9 February 2026 4 not participate in isolating Myanmar owing to their own strategic, security and economic interests. By acting in this way, they prevented the establishment of an effective sanctions regime. As traditional partners, Russia, China and North Korea continued to supply weapons to the military – as, indeed, did India. High-ranking members of the junta, including Min Aung Hlaing, went to Beijing and Moscow, among other places, and received diplomatic support on the international stage. Thus, it is not surprising that countries such as China, Russia and India welcomed the decision to hold the recent elections and sent election observers. ASEAN refrained from doing likewise, but ASEAN members Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia all sent their own observers. The interest of all these states in supporting the elections has little to do with the ballot itself. Indeed, there are three main reasons why they are intent on further normalising relations with Myanmar. First, Myanmar is very rich in mineral resources. Although almost half of the country’s population lives below the poverty line, Myanmar is the world’s third-largest producer of rare earths. More than 50 per cent of the rare earths processed in China today is mined in Myanmar, with much of that mining taking place at illegal sites inside conflict areas. Most of Myanmar’s mines are located in the border region with China and are currently under the control of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which is hostile to the junta and maintains close relations with Beijing. Access to rare earths and other raw materials such as jade, gold, copper and aluminium attracts not only China and India but also other neighbouring countries. And for Thailand, the environmental pollution associated with mining – for example, the discharge of toxins into rivers – is another important reason to engage with Myanmar in this sector. Second, many neighbouring countries are concerned about Myanmar’s role as a hub for organised crime since they have to deal with the negative fallout. Many of the