Myanmar: Digital Content Regulation an image he or she found online to create protest art in a way that does not violate copyright (say because it falls within the exceptions to copyright), would this be an offence under this provision? What if someone deleted a file which someone else wanted to preserve, something almost everyone has done? This provision is also problematical inasmuch as it repeats an existing criminal offence – stealing – which is already addressed in sections 378- 382 of Myanmar’s Penal Code19 in a way which is sufficient to address the theft of electronic property. Section 34(b) is also problematical as it appears that even the common, and completely benign, practice of forwarding emails unless both the originator and addressee have given permission for this, which is rare, is criminalised. Worse still is section 34(d), which has already led to some high profile and abusive prosecutions. This provision criminalises “creating, modifying or altering of information or distributing of information created, modified or altered by electronic technology to be detrimental to the interest of or to lower the dignity of any organization or any person”. The scope of protection here – against any detriment to one’s interests or any lowering of one’s dignity – is simply far too broad. In particular, it completely fails to respect international standards regarding defamation, which have been carefully crafted to represent an appropriate balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation. Sections 499-502 of Myanmar’s Penal Code already provide for up to two years’ imprisonment for defamation, and there is no need for a separate, far more crudely defined, defamation rule in the Electronic Transactions Law. Even the Penal Code provisions are problematical from the perspective of international law, both because they provide for imprisonment for defamation and because they fail to provide for some internationally recognised exceptions. Section 34(d) of the Electronic Transactions Law is significantly more problematical inasmuch as it is far broader – applying to any statement which lowers a person or organisation’s dignity or is detrimental to their interests – and it provides for an even harsher penalty – namely up to five years’ imprisonment. It also fails to incorporate any of the defences for defamation found in the Penal Code, for example true statements. Finally, 34(c) also fails to take into account the reality of the digital world. It prohibits any communication to any third party containing, among other things, a “security number, password or digital signature” without the consent of the owner. In practice, this happens every day when people forward on emails or other messages containing this sort of content. It may be noted that even if intent is read into these provisions, that would not protect users since they will clearly have had the requisite intent to do the prohibited communication. Recommendations: Myanmar Penal Code of 1860 (Indian Act XLV. 1860). Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mm/mm004en.pdf. 19 -9-