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19 Justice For Myanmar (2024), 'The Myanmar junta's partners in digital surveillance and censorship,' Justice For Myanmar website, 19 June, [accessed online], https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/the-myanmar-juntas-partners-in-digital-surveillance-andcensorship 20 Sohu (2024), op. cit. 21 San Yamin Aung (2017), 'China Burma sign five agreements,' The Irrawaddy website, 17 May, [accessed online], https:// www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/china-burma-sign-five-agreements.html 22 Thu Thu Aung and Poppy McPherson (2020), 'Myanmar China ink deals to accelerate Belt and Road as Xi courts an isolated Su,' Reuters website, 18 January, [accessed online], https://www.reuters.com/article/world/myanmar-china-ink-deals-to-accelerate-belt-and-road-asxi-courts-an-isolated-su-idUSKBN1ZH053/ 23 Nan Lwin (2018), 'China Myanmar agree 15 point MOU economic corridor,' The Irrawaddy website, 6 July, [accessed online], https:// www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/china-myanmar-agree-15-point-mou-economic-corridor.html 24 The Lowy Institute (2025) 'China's tightrope walk mediating Myanmar,' The Lowy Institute website, 19 March, [accessed online], https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-tightrope-walk-mediating-myanmar 25 Council on Foreign Relations, 'Assessing China Digital Silk Road,' Council on Foreign Relations website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/ 26 Sohu (2024), op. cit. 27 Nay Lin Tun (2022), 'The Relationship Between ICT Development and Economic Growth In Myanmar,' Master Of Development Studies Programme, Department Of Economics, Yangon University Of Economics, October, [accessed online], https://meral.edu.mm/record/8533/ files/Nay%20Lin%20Tun,%20EMDevS-30%20(17th%20Batch).pdf 28 Elizabeth C Economy (2018), 'The great firewall of China: Xi Jinping's internet shutdown,' The Guardian website, 29 June, [accessed online], https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/29/the-great-firewall-of-china-xi-jinpings-internet-shutdown 29 'Tiangou Secure Gateway English,' Geedge Networks website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https:// www.geedgenetworks.com/tiangou-secure-gateway-english/ 30 'Encrypted Traffic Visibility,' Geedge Networks website, [last accessed on September 2, 2025], https://www.geedgenetworks.com/ encrypted-traffic-visibility/ 31 InterSecLab (2025), ‘The Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes,’ InterSecLab organization website, 9 September, [accessed online], https://interseclab.org/research/8 32 Sumitomo Corporation (2025), ' Amendment of Telecommunications Business Agreement in Myanmar,' Sumitomo Corporation website, 28 April, [accessed online], https://www.sumitomocorp.com/en/mideast-africa/news/important/group/20250428 33 KDDI (2025), ‘ミャンマーにおける通信事業の契約改定につ��て [Revision of telecommunications contracts in Myanmar],' KDDI website, 28 April, [accessed online], https://newsroom.kddi.com/news/detail/kddi_nr_s-34_3804.html 34 KDDI (2021), ‘ミャンマーにおける通信事業への取り組みについて,' KDDI website, 29 September, [accessed online], https://news.kddi.com/kddi/corporate/csr-topic/2021/09/29/5443.html 35 Sumitomo Corporation (2021), Sumitomo Corporation’s Stance on Telecommunications Business in Myanmar,' Sumitomo Corporation website, 29 September, [accessed online], https://www.sumitomocorp.com/en/jp/news/important/group/20210929 36 Justice For Myanmar (2023), 'Israeli surveillance firm Cognyte's business in Myanmar exposed,' Justice For Myanmar website, 15 January [accessed online], https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/israeli-surveillance-firm-cognytes-business-in-myanmar-exposed 37 Justice For Myanmar (2020), 'Nodes of Corruption, Lines of Abuse,' Justice For Myanmar website, 20 December, [accessed online], https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/nodes-of-corruption-lines-of-abuse-how-mytel-viettel-and-a-global-network-of-businessessupport-the-international-crimes-of-the-myanmar-military 40

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Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

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Burmese
English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Restrictions
Military Coup

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Justice for Myanmar

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: A new leaked dataset reveals the Chinese company Geedge Networks’ business in Myanmar and exposes a significant number of telecommunications companies that are implementing sophisticated surveillance and censorship technology on behalf of the illegal Myanmar military junta. The leaked dataset offers detailed insights into the inner workings of Chinese internet surveillance and censorship technology that is exported to Myanmar by a company that frames its work as associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative. The dataset has been reviewed by a coalition of media and non-governmental/civil society organisations through the Great Firewall Export project made up of Amnesty International, InterSecLab, the Globe and Mail, Paper Trail Media, Tor Project, DER STANDARD, and Follow The Money. The Internet in Myanmar since the military’s February 2021 illegal coup attempt is among the most restricted in the world. The rolling out of a commercialised version of China’s Great Firewall gives the junta unprecedented access to and control over the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in Myanmar. Notably, the hardware, software and support provided by Geedge Networks to the Myanmar military junta enables the tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time by linking their activity to specific cell identifiers (cell IDs). As such, the junta has an enhanced capability to effectively track down, arrest, torture and kill human rights defenders, journalists and revolutionary forces across the country. The military junta can do so with the direct assistance of telecommunications companies in Myanmar exposed in the dataset – including ATOM (formerly Telenor Myanmar), Mytel, Myanma Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), Ooredoo Myanmar, Frontiir, StreamNet , Golden TMH Telecom, Internet Maekhong Network (IM-Net), Myanmar Broadband Telecom (MBT), Myanmar Telecommunication Network (MTN), Campana, Global Technology Group and China Unicom – that are integral to the set-up of a national firewall for the Myanmar junta. This investigation into the business dealings of Geedge Networks with the Myanmar junta builds on a June 2024 report by Justice For Myanmar into how Geedge was initiating country-wide internet surveillance and censorship through the junta-controlled Information Technology and Cyber Security Department (ITCSD) of the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC). 1 By providing hardware and software to the illegal Myanmar military junta, Geedge may be aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity, including the acts of torture and killing, carried out by members of the junta within a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population. Further investigation is required on this. In the meantime, Geedge Networks is limiting the rights to freedom of expression, association, and digital movement of the people of Myanmar. For that reason, Geedge Networks should be targeted with international sanctions, and individuals in directive and leadership positions within the company should be investigated for aiding and abetting violations of international human rights laws and potentially also international crimes. Telecommunications companies identified in the Geedge dataset as supporting the junta’s online surveillance machinery should be held to account for the serious risks of online and offline violence, and de facto harms such as arrests, torture and killings, of Myanmar civilians. Geedge Networks is closely affiliated with the Chinese state and export of its systems to Myanmar align with the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s involvement in the mass surveillance and repression of the civilian population in Myanmar is part of a broader pattern in which the Chinese government remains a principal supplier of arms to the Myanmar junta, aiding and abetting the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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Silk Road of Surveillance: The role of China's Geedge Networks and Myanmar telecommunications operators in the junta's digital terror campaign

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