training events with diverse actors, from both public and civil society organizations. One example is workshops during which the methodology for identifying disinformation is presented so that it can be applied by the workshop participants. PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS One of the strategies employed by public authorities involves verifying information, refuting fake news, and providing additional information. This method has been adopted by the Chamber of Deputies42 and by the federal government, particularly the Ministry of Health, during the Covid-19 pandemic.43 In the course of the 2018 attacks against the Electoral Justice by candidates and political groups (with allegations of electoral fraud), the TSE launched a series of campaigns and initiatives to combat false content. In 2017, it promoted a set of debates to generate proposals for the rules of the 2018 elections. In that same year it created a group with the participation of civil society entities and the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br, Comité Gestor da Internet no Brasil).44 The institution also held dialogues and signed partnerships with digital platforms to combat disinformation during elections. In 2019, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) opened an investigation into the production and dissemination of fake news with content that is detrimental to democracy, the Court itself, and some of its members. The narratives are allegedly promoted, in general, by supporters of President Jair Bolsonaro. The inquiries began in 2020 and were ongoing at the time of writing, in 2021. The process has already resulted in arrests and the issue of search-and-seizure warrants for politicians, bloggers, and businesspeople allied with President Bolsonaro. LAWS AND LEGAL INITIATIVES In Brazil, there are laws that directly or indirectly address disinformation practices. The Criminal Code contains a section referring to crimes against honor, which comprise the crimes of difamação (imputing to someone a fact that is offensive to his or her reputation), calúnia (falsely portraying someone as the author of a crime), and injúria (offending the dignity of another person). I N FO R M ATI O N D I SO R D ER IN THE GLOBA L SOUTH The electoral legislation also prohibits the spreading of false information. The Electoral Code (Law No. 4737 of 1965) makes it a crime to advertise facts about parties or candidates that are known to be untrue and that have the potential to influence voters, or to slander someone in electoral propaganda by falsely claiming that the person has committed a crime. The law also defines as a crime any attempt to provoke the instigation of judicial or administrative proceedings by attributing a crime to someone when the complainant knows that the accused is innocent. Furthermore, Brazil has many bills that regulate disinformation, directly or indirectly. Based on the narrative that the country’s institutions are being attacked and that something needs to be done, the passing of legislation to address disinformation and regulate social media has become the object of significant political pressure from different sides of the opposition to the government of Bolsonaro. The “fake news bill” (Bill No. 2630/2020) can be read like a description of the political crisis Brazil is going through. Still, it has the potential to be weaponized beyond its current capacity to resolve the crisis or to address authoritarian trends within the public sphere. It poses certain risks to fundamental rights, such as data retention and the “traceability measure” in instant messaging applications. The bill obliges applications to store for three months all the data necessary to identify the author of content shared between users whenever the message is “mass forwarded.” This covers all messages that were sent by more than five users to groups and transmission lists, in a period of fifteen days, and that reached over 1,000 users. This measure will target every viral message as suspicious and will endanger users who forward content for a number of reasons. There is also a risk that social movements and activists will end up being targeted if a court requests the data associated with their messages. The bill also establishes certain conditions to enhance “user identification.” For example, platforms may have to require users to identify themselves by presenting a valid ID in case they receive “reports” of illicit behavior—a very generic and open-ended requirement that triggers the obligation to collect personal user data. These provisions, and the requirement of a valid contract with an ISP to access certain messaging services, could create barriers for accessing the internet and its applications. Moreover, some aspects of the proposal need improvement, such as content moderation. The bill seeks to establish protections Latin America and the Caribbean – 1 0 0