● Saw Chit Thu, Tin Win, and Mote Thone - EU Sanctions on 22 October 2024
for human rights violations tied to scam compounds. Also highlights a
business: Chit Linn Myaing Group (CLM).
● KNA, Saw Chit Thu, Saw Htoo Eh Moo and Saw Chit Chit - US Sanctions on 5
May 2025, “...for their role in facilitating cyber scams that harm U.S. citizens,
human trafficking, and cross-border smuggling”. Saw Htoo Eh Moo and Saw
Chit Chit are Saw Chit Thu’s sons.
● She Zhijiang and eight other targets operating in Shwe Kokko - US
Sanctions on 8 September 2025 tied to scam centre operations.
● Mote Thone - Thai official arrest warrant on 27 July 2026, for human
trafficking, drug trafficking, and operating online scam networks.
It is also important to mention that many reported arrests in Myanmar have
involved foreign nationals at lower- and mid-level positions in these scam
compounds, with no mention of the main organisers. Although this finding does
not alone disprove the KNA statement on 17 November 2025, it suggests that this
type of public narrative focuses on visible arrests, rather than on higher-level
responsibility regarding scam operations in Shwe Kokko.
3.1.2 BLAMING THE KNU
The military’s March 2026 statement blamed the KNU as the perpetrators for
sheltering scam operation crimes in KK Park and Shwe Kokko. They even refer to
the KNU as “terrorists”, which they legally designated as of August 2025. However,
the KNU does not have control over Shwe Kokko; the KNA (formerly KBGF) does.
The KNU has been accused in various reports of having ties to Huanya
International City Project and KK Park, through leasing land and project approval
arrangements. KNU released a statement in May 2023 stating it would investigate
allegations that some of its senior members were involved in these projects.
However, it later said that the matter remained under review. Although these
examples are distinct from Shwe Kokko, they are relevant because they illustrate
why the military’s narrative blaming the KNU for scam activity in Shwe Kokko is
misaligned with the current on-the-ground control structure.
Furthermore, as stated, other armed parties in Kayin State, especially the DKBA
and the KNA lineage, have been connected to reports of scam operations and
other related exploitation in the area. This is important because the military’s
March 2026 statement singled out only the KNU, even though the control behind
Shwe Kokko sits more under the KNA rather than the KNU itself. This framing from
the military suggests that the state may be focusing attention toward one actor
while potentially downplaying other armed groups more closely connected to the
area.
www.info-res.org
www.myanmarwitness.org
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