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Contd. Pakistan and Geedge Geedge Platforms on Old Hardware and Troubling Privacy Concerns In their new report Shadows of Control, Amnesty International’s Security Lab writes that one of the most important revelations from the leak of documents from Geedge Networks is “how technologies from different suppliers can be inter-dependent and repurposed to work together.”53 In other words, the system established by Sandvine became a foundation, and when their contract not renewed, Geedge was able to repurpose Sandvine’s hardware to run the Geedge operating system. Amnesty found a document showing the design of the WMS, from July 20, 2023, running Geedge’s TSG platform on repurposed Sandvine hardware.54 While built on repurposed hardware, a report in Al Jazeera hints at how much the Geedge system might have cost: officials who spoke to the Qatari news broadcasters on condition of anonymity said that a new Chinese system from an unnamed supplier would cost Pakistan between 20 to 30 billion rupees ($72 million to $107 million), and was responsible for the slower internet speeds and full-on shutdowns reported by users in the second half of 2024.55 The Geedge system can capture more than metadata. If a connection is unencrypted, the system will also opportunistically capture the content. Amnesty International found one support ticket in Geedge’s Jira system with the full content of two emails including attachments and the e-mail password, which was intercepted by TSG on an unencrypted connection to an email server.56 It is concerning that sensitive user data is included in a support ticket for a third-party service provider, and that this sensitive data was part of a leak. To further illustrate the troubling issues of user data and privacy within the Pakistan case, as Amnesty points out, since 2015 every new SIM card issued to a mobile subscriber in the country must be registered to a particular user and linked to biometrics including fingerprints that are registered via the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). People need a NADRA profile to access basic services like healthcare, banking, and education. The NADRA profile also links to other databases, like voter registration and tax records, which combined create a comprehensive record on every citizen. 57 A core feature of Geedge’s Sanity Directory component is attributing traffic to a specific SIM card. This enables, not only mass surveillance, but highly targeted micro-surveillance on specific individuals in Pakistan and other countries Geedge operates.

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The Internet Coup A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes

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English

Topic

Digital Rights
Digital Surveillance
Internet Connectivity / Accessibility
Internet Restrictions

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INTER SECLAB

Date Published: Sep 9, 2025

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has been steadily refining their model of internet control using surveillance and censorship technologies domestically while promoting this approach to other nations under the banner of “digital sovereignty”. Through the export of these technologies, China is not only extending its global influence but also laying the foundation for a federated system of internet governance. In this system, Chinese companies provide the infrastructure and expertise for client governments to more easily monitor and control their own networks, while learning from these deployments and improving collective capacity for digital authoritarianism worldwide.

This research by InterSecLab uncovers evidence of the export of a suite of technologies resembling China’s Great Firewall by Geedge Networks, a private company linked to the academic entity ‘Massive and Effective Stream Analysis’ (Mesalab), a research laboratory at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our team’s investigation identifies a pattern of commercialization of surveillance capabilities, with Geedge Networks offering a suite of products that enable comprehensive monitoring and control of internet users.

InterSecLab’s analysis reveals that Geedge Networks is contracted with governments in Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Myanmar, and one other unknown country to establish sophisticated systems of internet censorship and surveillance. Furthermore, our findings indicate that Geedge Networks is also involved in developing similar systems deployed within China, including in Xinjiang and other regions.

Based on analysis of a leak of more than 100,000 Geedge Networks documents that was shared with InterSecLab, this research sheds light on the features and capabilities of Geedge Networks’ systems, which include deep packet inspection, real-time monitoring of mobile subscribers, granular control over internet traffic, as well as censorship rules that can be tailored to each region. The leak also reveals information about Geedge Networks’ relationship with the academic entity, Mesalab, as well as their interactions with client governments. The implications for data sovereignty are significant, and our findings raise concerns about the commoditization of surveillance and information control technologies.

This research examines the recent development of Geedge Networks’ systems in various countries, including what is known about their deployment timelines. By analyzing the company’s internal documentation, InterSecLab was able to chronicle the expansion of commercially available national firewalls and speculate about the implications for the future of the global internet considering the spread of such systems.

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The Internet Coup A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes

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