A Chinese vs Russian System A key discovery from the leaked documents and shipping records is critical evidence that Kazakhstan’s internet surveillance apparatus is sourced from China, via Geedge, rather than from Russia, as previous research has presumed. It has been long believed that the Kazakh government operated a deep-packet inspection system based on the Russian SORM (System for Operative Investigative Activities). The assumption that the Kazakh SORM system was capable of DPI and sourced from Russia was likely due to the close cultural relationships between the two countries, as well as statements and reporting from 2019 mentioning SORM and Russian connections.30  Compared to SORM, the Geedge suite is a distinct system with more advanced surveillance capabilities. SORM can be considered a “legal intercept” (LI) system, which collects simple data such as connection time stamps and a user’s IP address.31 The Geedge system not only extracts a lot more information through the DPI but is designed for levels of mass surveillance that surpass the capabilities of legal intercept. Source documents from the leak reveal Geedge translated its end-user documentation into Russian for the Kazakhstan project, instead of the official Kazakh state language. This could indicate an intention to market the product in other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. As Geedge Networks' first client, Kazakhstan offers insights into the company's earliest business model. The country's legislative environment creates an attractive market for Geedge. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s use of Geedge’s suite of products allows Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s government to maintain a veneer of political reform while exercising unprecedented control over its population and opposition. Tokayev’s concept of a "listening state" takes on a second, chilling meaning with Geedge Networks' technology, enabling the state to eavesdrop on the entire country's network and mobile communications.32