Legal Framework: An International Human Rights Approach to Addressing Hate Speech and Protecting Free Expression in Myanmar provoke, incite violence, discrimination and hatred; many others have reported similar hate speech.639 Ethnic and religious minorities are routinely vilified and portrayed as being less than human.640 The Rohingya’s chosen identity and name for instance is completely denied, and instead they have been called “Bengali,” the many derivatives of “kalar”, and referred to as everything from fleas, dogs, weeds and carps that spread uncontrollably, to floating garbage of unknown origin (Yay Myaw Kan Tin).641 If the aforementioned hate speech were restricted to a small audience, then perhaps it may not warrant criminalization or trigger concern about international atrocity crimes. However, state and non-state actors have leveraged both online and offline platforms and multiple mediums to extensively reach and communicate with a large audience.642 Many in the audience have little to no digital literacy and may not be equipped to critically examine the widely disseminated messages of incitement that have called on them to defend their race and religion using force.643 The final factor to consider is the likelihood and imminence of harm against a targeted group, including whether there is a reasonable probability that hate speech would lead to real world action against the targeted individual or communities. If there is such a risk, the state is obligated to inter- vene on their behalf.644 For Myanmar, the country has moved far past imminence. For example, the world has witnessed actual harms unleashed by state and non-state actors in Rakhine State.645 The FFM report pages are replete with testimonies from Rohingya refugees, detailing atrocity crimes following the violence 2012, 2016 and 2017 clearance operations which forced nearly a million Rohing- ya to flee to Bangladesh.646 Part III also details additional examples, including the targeting of specific individuals who have since fled the country.647 After evaluating the Rabat Plan of Action factors in the context of incitement, there is little need to spend much time assessing the non-legal tools that Myanmar should be using to combat the root causes of hate speech. Indeed, if the state is not preventing and punishing incitement and instead has been linked to such activities, it is not surprising that the state has not been actively supporting education efforts, intracultural dialogues, or a healthy media environment to promote tolerance and counter hate speech. Part III catalogs the underlying drivers and how deeply entrenched they are in power structures in Myanmar. Ultimately, to date, whether the hate speech has been in its most ex- treme form of inciting genocide or in its systemic cultural form that pervades society, Myanmar has failed to address the problem. Instead, hate speech has helped fuel violations of Myanmar’s ethnic and religious minority communities’ human rights and in the case of the Rohingya, it has enabled genocid- al violence and atrocity crimes. If left unaddressed, hate speech will only continue to threaten social cohesion, stability, and peace in Myanmar. 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 See, e.g., Fuller; Gravers; Mozur; “An Unholy Alliance,” Al Jazeera; International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power.” Ibid. See generally Beech, “Across Myanmar”; A/HRC/39/64, paras. 35, 46, 86. See Mozur. BSR., 12-14. See, e.g., Guiding Principles, para. 1; A/74/486, para. 24; Rabat Plan of Action, para. 14. See generally Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do Is Pray. See A/HRC/39/64. FGD (January 2019 and December 2019). 95