Analysis: Current Landscape of Hate Speech in Myanmar The “Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law” placed restrictions on interfaith marriages and limited the rights non-Buddhist men, including custodial rights.239 The “Population Control Healthcare Law” required 36-months birth spacing for couples.240 The “Religious Conversion Law” created a new system of state oversight for those who wished to change religion.241 Lastly, the “Monogamy Law” prohibited polygamy, and though the law does not explicitly mention Muslims or the Rohingya, its discriminatory intent based on anti-Muslim stereotypes is evident.242 The stereotypes are that Muslims in Myanmar are polygamous and have high birth rates, and they are also seeking to marry Buddhist women and convert them to Islam.243 The women organizations in Myanmar voiced its opposition and mobilized against the dis- criminatory laws.244 For example, women’s rights groups held public events and press conferences asserting that the four laws contravene Myanmar’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).245 969 and Ma Ba Tha in turn labelled them “race traitors” and threatened them with violence.246 Nearly all prominent women’s rights leaders who spoke out against the ultranationalists re- ported having their social media, email, and phone hacked.247 Others received threatening mes- sages and texts. Several tried to open “first information” reports (an initial step required before police can investigate the alleged offence) with the police but were turned away.248 Ultimately, the four laws were passed in 2015.249 It is worth noting that women’s bodies and allegations of rape and dishonor at the hands of Muslims have been used by 969 and Ma Ba Tha to incite violence and yet the draft “Protection and Prevention of Violence Against Women Law” has been stalled since 2014.250 The four laws, on the other hand, managed to get drafted and passed in a mere eighteen months.251 The necessity of Myanmar’s military strength The narrative that the military’s power and control is essential to resist existential and terrorist threats to the country as a whole has been central to the Tatmadaw’s continued dominance in Myanmar. In this narrative, “Burmese ultranationalism comes out from national security—[the idea] that 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 Ibid., 11-12. Ibid. Ibid., 12-13. Ibid. Ibid. FGD (January 2019 and December 2019); See also Wai Moe, “Burma’s Women Are Still Fighting for Their Rights,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/02/burmas-women-are-still-fighting-for-their-rightsmyanmar/. Matthew Walton, Melyn McKay, and Daw Khin Mar Mar Kyi, “Women and Myanmar’s ‘Religious Protection Laws,” The Review of Faith and International Affairs 13, no. 4 (2015): 36-49. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Crisis Group, “Buddhist and State Power,” 13-20. Ibid. Ibid. 47