Analysis: Current Landscape of Hate Speech in Myanmar we are weak, our land will become Muslim.”219 His now defunct personal blog contained a whole series of videos dedicated to jihad threats including those entitled “Defend against the dangers of Jihad,” “Jihad and the future,” and “Jihad war and future Myanmar.”220 Fundamental misperceptions about Islam have circulated at the community level as well. One CSO member described the effectiveness of local misinformation: I usually heard rumors in our community that in Islam, religious people are not al- lowed to look up when they worship in the mosque because their god is a dog or a pig . . . . After that, I started to see my Muslim friends differently. I believed what I heard about the mosque, which is not true, but I couldn’t know, because I have never been to one.221 Such misperceptions about Islam have been further reinforced by international events, acts of terrorism in other countries, and global discourse on terrorism more broadly. Activists have pointed out that ultranationalist groups have sensationalized attacks by ISIS and Al Qaeda for example by sharing graphic videos and photos from these terrorist groups designed to conflate Jihadism with Islam: “Even in the international community, Muslims are being hated by many different people because of . . . suicide bomb[ing]s, so Myanmar is impacted by that as well.”222 Local CSOs from Yangon, Mandalay, Taunggyi, and Bago shared an example of a deliberate at- tempt by unknown forces to use 9/11 to incite local violence.223 On September 11, 2017, a chain mail message went out on Facebook Messenger to both Buddhists and Muslims in the four cities.224 The message aimed at Buddhists stated that Muslims were gathering in a nearby mosque to celebrate 9/11 by waging an attack on Buddhist soil like they had done in the United States.225 The Muslims were warned at the same time that Buddhists were coming to destroy their mosques and businesses.226 CSOs from the aforementioned cities reported that cooperation, mutual trust, and open com- munications between Muslim and Buddhist communities ensured that violence did not break out at the time, but that it could very well have escalated.227 Many believe incidents like this one highlight a concerted and coordinated effort by actors within Myanmar seeking to sow chaos and turn people against each other.228 CSOs believe that these forces have significant resources, technical know-how, and access to individuals’ personal backgrounds that enable them to tailor and send out targeted messages en masse.229 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 Thomas Fuller, “Extremism Rises Among Myanmar Buddhists,” The New York Times, June 20, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/world/asia/extremism-rises-among-myanmar-buddhists-wary-of-muslim-minority.html. On file with civil society activists in Myanmar. 002-R4-04, 3. 002-R1-01, 5. FGD (January 2019 and December 2019); Mozur. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. FGD (January 2019); MS-R2-01. Ibid.; Mozur. Ibid.; See also YGN-R1-01. 45