Analysis: Current Landscape of Hate Speech in Myanmar ently [to the situation]. They are [dark], and poor, and from a different religion—and that makes them doubly or triply discriminated against.180 Activists also described a daily discourse steeped in prejudice. They pointed to a number of Bur- mese sayings like, “if you see a viper and a Rakhine, you need to kill the Rakhine first.”181 A common warning offered by parents when trying to silence their crying children is: “a kalar [derogatory term used to describe Muslims and people of Indian descent or dark-skinned Asians] is coming, and if you cry, he will take you away,” leading “kids to grow up knowing this group as a threat.”182 Constructed Narratives Against this contextual backdrop, a troubling picture of the narratives driving and perpetuated by hate speech has emerged. The key narratives captured in the consultations and interviews were as follows: (1) Race, religion, and country are under threat from both non-Bamar ethnic groups and non-Buddhists; (2) Islam in particular poses an imminent threat, as a “violent” foreign religion that seeks to overpower Buddhism in Myanmar; (3) Ultranationalists frame threats in gendered, derogato- ry ways, asserting that women are particularly vulnerable to the predatory attacks from Muslim men and singling out women HRDs and journalists who push back against such narratives; (4) Against these threats, military strength is essential to protect the nation’s borders, unity, and continued existence; (5) A biased and misinformed international community is targeting Myanmar, interfering with its sovereignty; and (6) Those that question or challenge the aforementioned narratives—for exam- ple, the activists interviewed for this report—are “race traitors” and foreign agents who are equally dangerous to the nation’s sanctity and security. A Buddhist-Burman nation under threat Perhaps most critical to the rise and penetration of hate speech and ultranationalism has been the underlying narrative of Myanmar as a nation facing existential threats from both EAOs and religious fundamentalists. This account has portrayed Myanmar as a Buddhist-Burman nation.183 According to an activist, “in the country, nationalism plus religion is always mixed up and utilized as a political card.”184 Buddhist-Burman majority identity has been framed as being in opposition to the country’s other ethnic and religious communities.185 This narrative has been backed by a distorted version of history that celebrates Burmans alone as the winners of Myanmar’s independence, and frames the position and inclusion of other ethnic nationalities as a generous offer from the Burman majority in power.186 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 002-R1-01, 3; See also FGD (January 2019 and December 2019). Ibid, 5; See also Jonathan Head, “Rakhine State: Hatred and Despair in Myanmar’s Restive Region,” BBC News, February 8, 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42899242. 002-R4-04, 3; See also Gravers. See International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power;” Kate Hodal, “Buddhist monk uses racism and rumours to spread hatred in Burma,” The Guardian, 18 April 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/18/buddhist-monk-spreads-hatred-burma. 002-R1-01, 2. FGD (January 2019 and December 2019); See also Gravers; Hodal; Holmes. Ibid. 39