Background: History of Hate Speech in Myanmar authorities have permitted these gatherings while they routinely disband peace protests against mil- itary offensives in ethnic regions and arresting the organizers.106 Eyewitnesses to the violence have similarly reported that police officers have stood by while mobs attacked and destroyed mosques and Muslim shops and homes.107 Furthermore, activists have documented that almost every major outbreak of anti-Muslim violence since 2012 was preceded by a 969-sponsored sermon tour in the area, usually led by U Wirathu himself.108 Myanmar CSOs interviewed for this report believe that the military and ultranationalist groups have been using Facebook to strategically spread hate speech and misinformation.109 Hateful rheto- ric and incitement of violence towards ethnic and religious minorities circulate through newsfeeds, fake news, inflammatory posts, poems, articles, comments, graphic images, and propaganda videos primed for “liking” and “sharing” widely.110 Ultranationalist groups have also been taking advantage of the wider lack of digital literacy in Myanmar.111 For example, in October 2018, the New York Times uncovered a systematic online campaign by Tatmadaw personnel to create negative content aimed at the Rohingya and Muslims in Myanmar.112 According to the article, “hundreds of military personnel created troll accounts and news and celebrity pages on Facebook and then flooded them with incendiary comments and posts timed for peak viewership. . . . [O]fficers were also tasked with collecting intelligence on popular accounts and criticizing posts unfavorable to the military.”113 Facebook’s head of cybersecurity confirmed that there was “clear and deliberate attempts to covertly spread propaganda that were directly linked to the Myanmar military.”114 The Russian military is also alleged to have assisted the Tatmadaw’s online influence campaigns.115 The 2018 report of the UN-mandated Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (“FFM”) found that Facebook has been “slow and ineffective” in responding to the calls to mitigate hate speech on its platform and called for a thorough investigation on the extent to which activities on the platform led to real-world discrimination and violence.116 By 2018, Facebook had begun to bolster its efforts to address hate speech in Myanmar by commissioning an independent human rights impact assessment, committing to hiring 100 native Burmese speakers as content moder- ators, and banning certain Tatmadaw leaders from its platform.117 However, its decision in February 2019 to ban four EAOs as “dangerous organizations” but not the Tatmadaw, raises questions about Facebook’s efforts as well as its ability and willingness to engage with local stakeholders to effectively 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 Ibid. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 16. FGD (January 2019). Ibid.; Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military,” The New York Times, October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html/. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. United Nations, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/39/64 (September 2018), para. 74. BSR, Human Rights Impact Assessment: Facebook in Myanmar (2018), 21, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/bsr-facebook-myanmar-hria_final.pdf. 25