22 Hate Speech Ignited: Understanding Hate Speech in Myanmar Finally, the government and military’s exclusionary identity politics around race and religion from the previous eras remained dominant. In many regards, race and religion took center stage during the transitional period. Of particular note during this time was the rise of social media, the growth of high-profile ultranationalist groups that exploited racial and religious differences, and the failure of prominent political leaders to stand up for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities.65 The Rise of Social Media Since 2010 and Pathways to Violence For decades, information was strictly controlled under military rule. Such restrictions continued into the new millennium. For example, SIM cards were sold at an artificially high price, effectively limiting access to the Internet and mobile phones to “members of associates of the state apparatus unlikely to challenge the status quo.”66 In 2011, Myanmar had the lowest mobile penetration in the world at 2.6 percent,67 and an Internet penetration rate of 1 percent.68 Access to information began to change with the liberalization of the telecommunications sector in June 2014, when the government granted operator licenses to two international companies.69 The subsequent proliferation of mobile phone shops selling low-cost web-enabled phones led to an un- precedented increase in the number of smartphone users in the country.70 In just two years, over 43 million SIM cards were sold, and around half regularly used Internet data.71 Facebook benefited the most from the telecommunications boom. Many people saw Facebook as an “all-in-one solution” that provided messaging, news, and entertainment.72 Catching on to the trend, mobile phone operators began to offer deals enabling users to use Facebook without data charges.73 For many mobile phone users in Myanmar, Facebook became synonymous with the Internet.74 The rise of Facebook in Myanmar coincided with the abolition of direct media censorship in August 2012.75 While these changes opened up the country to new sources of information and more free press than Myanmar had seen in decades, the new atmosphere also enabled ultranationalist groups—including monks affiliated with the 969 Movement (“969”) like U Wirathu, and Ma Ba Tha, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion—to stoke fear and incite violence against eth- nic and religious minorities.76 Central to these xenophobic campaigns has been the idea of a Myanmar reserved for Buddhist Bamars.77 The ultranationalist movement in Myanmar incorporated decades 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 Timothy McLaughlin, “How Facebook’s Rise Fueled Chaos and Confusion in Myanmar,” Wired, July 6, 2018, https:// www.wired.com/story/how-facebooks-rise-fueled-chaos-and-confusion-in-myanmar/. Gerard McCarthy, Cyber-Spaces, in Routledge Handbook, 92. Ibid., 93. Freedom House, Burma: Freedom on the Net (2012), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/burma. See generally Steve Stecklow, “Why Facebook Is Losing the War on Hate Speech in Myanmar,” Reuters, August 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/. Qatari company Oooredoo and Norwegian company Telenor. McCarthy, 93. Ibid. Ibid. Stecklow, “Why Facebook is Losing the War.” Ibid. McCarthy, 94. Under the new rules, journalists do not have to submit reports to state censors before publication. However, there remain criminal provisions for distribution of information detrimental to national security, such as the Electronic Transaction Law of 2004. Aung Hla Hun, “Myanmar government abolishes direct media censorship,” Reuters, August 20, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-censorship-idUSBRE87J06N20120820. McLaughlin. International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar,” Crisis Group Asia Report, no. 290 (September