INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN 2023 53 VI. Recommendations for stakeholders The findings of this report underscore that all stakeholders must act urgently to halt the growing weaponization of internet shutdowns and work together to address their devastating impact on human rights. In 2023, people were targeted with an unprecedented number of conflict-related shutdowns. The international community has not responded consistently from one conflict to another, and has generally failed to sustain efforts to help people who have been deliberately cut off from the world and are in dire need of emergency and humanitarian assistance. To address the use of shutdowns in conflict-affected areas, we call on all stakeholders to take the following actions:310 States should: • Create, sustain, and protect digital mediation and cyber peacebuilding efforts, investing in civil society capacity to help reduce disruptions and ensure lasting resolutions;312 • Ensure no military aid or other forms of assistance are used to enable digital repression, targeting of civilian infrastructure, or other humanitarian or human rights abuses; • Strengthen language across UN resolutions to prioritize open, secure, stable, interoperable, and affordable telecommunications and internet connectivity as an essential service and foundation to ensure the continuation of critical services; and • Take action individually and collectively, including through networks such as the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), to urgently call out specific perpetrators of conflict-related shutdowns. Parties to these conflicts should: • Immediately cease the indiscriminate targeting of civilian objects, including medical, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure; more broadly, halt the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons in populated areas; and abstain from these practices going forward;311 • Ensure that the civilian population has access to accessible, reliable, open, and secure telecommunications infrastructure, enabling them to receive early warnings, communicate with humanitarian services and their loved ones, and otherwise exercise their fundamental human rights; • Lift any blockades on and boost access to fuel, electricity, and other vital resources for civilian purposes, including powering essential infrastructure such as civilian cell towers; and • Allow freedom of movement and safe passage to service providers working to repair damaged or malfunctioning telecommunications infrastructure. Private actors should: • Adopt policies and practices that identify, assess, and address the heightened human rights risks inherent in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, including in connectivity management, data integrity, and content governance, and even before a conflict occurs;313 • Clearly communicate to users any limitations, restrictions, or changes to service they may experience and provide regular updates on system status; • Preserve adequate documentation of any orders received to disrupt civilian telecommunications services or communications platforms, in particular where it may provide supporting evidence in trial against authorities for international crimes; and 310 Targeted recommendations for individual conflict zones are available for Gaza, Ukraine, and Myanmar: supra note 236; supra note 10; supra note 149. 311 See ICRC (2024). ICRC president: "We are witnessing a global and collective failure to protect civilians in armed conflicts". https://www.icrc.org/en/document/global-and-collective-failure-to-protect-civilians-in-armed-conflict. 312 See supra note 236. 313 See Access Now (2023). Tech and conflict: a guide for responsible business conduct. https://www.accessnow.org/guide/ tech-and-conflict-a-guide-for-responsible-business-conduct/; supra note 37.