Freedom House smothered what was already a heavily restricted information environment. One law criminalized the advertisement of VPNs, advancing the government’s existing efforts to limit the use of such tools to access uncensored information. A February 2024 law banned Russians from advertising on websites and social media channels that were labeled as “foreign agents,” forcing the country’s few remaining independent media channels, largely active on Telegram and YouTube, to downsize their operations and lay off staff. Distortion of the information space Progovernment commentators who used deceitful or covert tactics to manipulate online information were active in at least 21 of the 41 FOTN countries that held or prepared for nationwide elections during the coverage period. Content manipulation campaigns warped online discussion by perpetuating falsehoods about the democratic process, manufacturing inauthentic support for official narratives, or discrediting those who presented a threat to the leadership’s political dominance. These networks often worked in tandem with state-controlled or -aligned news media, deployed bot accounts across social media, generated fake websites to spoof real news outlets, and harnessed genuine enthusiasm from political loyalists. Such content manipulation is a less visible form of control than outright censorship, and it may trigger less political blowback, making it a lower-risk tactic that can yield the high reward of reshaping an online environment and even winning an election. An evolution of players and tactics The actors involved in disinformation campaigns, as well as their incentives and the technology they employ, have evolved in recent years. To gain plausible deniability regarding their involvement, political leaders have increasingly outsourced content manipulation to social media influencers and shady public-relations firms that benefit from lucrative contracts or political connections. Influencers who participate in content manipulation leverage the trust and loyalty they have built with their followers to promote false, misleading, or divisive Warping the internet ahead of the vote In the 41 FOTN countries that held or prepared for nationwide elections, many governments resorted to online censorship or content manipulation, often in an effort to retain power. Serbia Progovernment media outlets spread content that falsely accused the opposition of buying votes ahead of the December 2023 elections. Pakistan Authorities used offline and online controls to repress the party of former prime minister Imran Khan, imprisoning its leaders and restricting access to connectivity and social media during its rallies. 25 People in 25 countries faced censorship during electoral periods 21 Progovernment commentators were active in 21 countries during electoral periods Venezuela Zimbabwe Bangladesh Nicolás Maduro’s regime blocked websites that listed polling locations during an opposition primary. Censorship intensified after the July 2024 presidential vote, which the ruling party manipulated. Ahead of the August 2023 elections, commentators linked to the ruling party heaped abuse on impartial election observers. Authorities restricted internet connectivity during an opposition rally in October 2023 and blocked independent news sites around the January 2024 elections. Certain territories that are assessed separately in Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report are excluded from the relevant country assessments in FOTN, as conditions in territories differ significantly from those in the rest of the country. This infographic is from the Freedom on the Net 2024 report, as seen on www.freedomhouse.org. @freedomhouse freedomhouse.org 9