138 C. ORJUELA to the 1940s (van Klinken and Thazin Aung 2017; Nanayakkara 2016). In Sri Lanka, the well-organised and -resourced BBS builds on experiences of earlier Buddhist nationalist political parties and lobby organisations. In Myanmar, authoritarian rule restricted civil society mobilisation, and the more loosely organised and grassroots based 969 and Ma Ba Tha are newer phenomena that emerged during the (quasi)democratisation process (Schonthal and Walton 2016; van Klinken and Thazin Aung 2017). The relations between the Buddhist nationalist groups and the state have been ambivalent. On the one hand, the symbols and names of 969 and Ma Ba Tha have been proscribed by the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee in Myanmar, and Wirathu was imprisoned for his divisive speeches in 2003 and banned from speaking publicly in 2017. On the other hand, prominent Ma Ba Tha monks campaigned on the side of the party of the former military regime in the 2015 elections. There is a widespread belief that the military supports or gives free reign to the group, hoping that religious divisions will destabilise the country and invite a more prominent role for the military (interviews, 2017; van Klinken and Thazin Aung 2017). The struggle against authoritarian rule – in which Buddhist monks played a significant role in 1988 and 2007 – involved people from all religious backgrounds. As there is no longer an obvious shared enemy, divisions, which can be exploited, have emerged (interviews, 2017). In Sri Lanka, the war between the government and Tamil separatists had polarised society along ethnic lines. After the defeat of the separatists in 2009, the Muslims – who had mostly collaborated with the Sinhalese-dominated government – were framed as a new adversary. This enemy image served to strengthen the political leaders who had built their power on the fight against terrorism; BBS in Sri Lanka was believed to have close links to the semi-authoritarian post-war government run by Mahinda Rajapaksa (see Silva 2016, 123). Although the nationalist movements spearheaded by Ma Ba Tha and BBS had historical precursors, two things were new. First, they appeared at a time when a global war on terror and anti-Muslim discourse was an important reference point. Second, the developments in communication technology made social media a new, effective vehicle for outreach and mobilisation (Schissler 2016; Ivarsson Holgersson 2018). The nationalist organisations are made up of both Buddhist monks and lay persons, who engage in large-scale rallies and campaigns to boycott Muslim products and businesses, but also education and social welfare. Ma Ba Tha, for instance, has a strong local presence and appeal through its Dhamma schools (Buddhist ‘Sunday schools’) and the opportunities it offers women (McKey and Win 2018). Local conflicts around archeological sites, the placement of Buddha statues and the celebration of Muslim festivals have led to religiously framed confrontations. Although the violence against Muslims cannot be indisputably linked to organisations like Ma Ba Tha and BBS, the incidents have followed similar patterns. The triggering event has often been skirmishes between individuals, which have led to mob violence targeting Muslim property and individuals, against which the police have failed to act. Often, rumors on social media and speeches by key figures in the Buddhist organisations have spread hatred and legitimised violence (Silva 2016; Haniffa 2016b; ICG 2013). Descriptions of ‘religious conflict’ tend to create impressions of homogeneous groups, ignoring considerable internal complexity. What all Muslim groups in the two countries share, though, is their minority status and a history of avoidance of confrontation with the Buddhist majority. The level of marginalisation of Muslims differs significantly between and