Recommendations
ARTICLE 19
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develop strategies for responding to coordinated abuse of content moderation systems,
including Vietnam-specific responses;
•
expand and collaborate with industry-wide advocacy efforts, including to ensure that they
are informed by an evaluation of human rights concerns and risks for users;
•
report transparently on possible government surveillance via their platforms and on any
actions which would enable government access to user data in Vietnam, including
government requests for such data;
•
regularly reassess their bargaining power and ability to challenge government demands
for cooperation in human rights violations, and tailor their actions accordingly;
•
cooperate with both domestic and international researchers to enable better reporting on
government operations such as Force 47 and civilian counterparts; and
•
recognise that local companies are under intense pressure to cooperate in human rights
violations, and integrate this knowledge into their human rights due diligence and risk
mitigation measures when working with local businesses.
Recommendations for tech companies operating in Myanmar
Tech companies operating in Myanmar should:
•
adopt Myanmar-specific human rights strategies and policies that are conflict-sensitive,
responsive to the reality of a multilingual and multi-ethnic society, and reflect the real
dangers faced by users of retaliation based on their use of online platforms;
•
consider a multi-company mechanism to promote coordination among the main tech
platforms operating in Myanmar, including the possibility of taking rapid action in
response to highly harmful content;
•
establish ties with civil society and exile groups which can provide necessary context and
information regarding the local impact of their policies and operations;
•
allocate appropriate staff and resources to Myanmar-focused human rights operations,
including staff with local knowledge and languages;
•
report regularly on actions taken to implement Myanmar-specific policies announced after
the 2021 coup, as well as earlier policies such as those responding to anti-Rohingya hate
speech, and regularly revise and update these policies; and
•
report publicly on the risk of military access to user data and establish systems for
communicating these risks to local groups.
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