Myanmar ARTICLE 19 Telenor’s sale was controversial for a number of reasons. First, M1 Group itself has a reputation for working with authoritarian regimes while disregarding human rights, including operating mobile networks in Yemen, Syria, Liberia, and Sudan, the last of these including during the Darfur genocide.225 Second, the inclusion of Shwe Byain Phyu gave the military direct access to the successor company. Third, there was significant concern that the sale would involve the transfer of sensitive personal data which could then be accessed by the military, as well as technology which could potentially be misused by the military to target human rights defenders and activists. Civil society and advocacy organisations campaigned extensively around the Telenor sale, hoping to mitigate its harms if it was not possible to block it completely. This included a challenge by 474 Myanmar civil society groups represented by the Dutch NGO SOMO (the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations) at the OECD’s Norwegian National Contact Point – a mechanism which allows complaints against companies based in countries which have committed to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct. The complaint argued that Telenor had not conducted appropriate due diligence, had not sufficiently engaged relevant stakeholders in relation to the sale, and had not been transparent about its decision to exit Myanmar. 226 While the complaint was not successful at stopping the sale, following mediation SOMO and Telenor signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which Telenor agreed to conduct an internal review process, fund an independent study, and explore the creation of a ‘digital security relief mechanism’ to provide financial, legal, and training support to Myanmar citizens facing risks associated with their exit from the country.227 Telenor did engage somewhat with civil society, but it argued that it could not comply with many of their demands due to its obligation to protect the safety of its in-country employees. For example, when human rights groups pressured Telenor to ensure that its data was not handed over to the military, Telenor said that closing operations and deleting data would have placed employees in Myanmar ‘at considerable risk’.228 Telenor certainly was in an extremely challenging situation, especially in relation to some of its employees, who were prevented from leaving the country. However, it could have done much more, including conducting better human rights due diligence when it entered the market in the first place, being much more transparent about its actions, and doing more to reach out to impacted groups following the coup. It is also not clear whether Telenor rigorously mapped the potential rights impacts of its sale and incorporated such mapping into its decision-making. ____________________________________________ 225 Justice for Myanmar, Exposing the Business Networks Fuelling Brutality and Corruption, 9 July 2021. OECD Watch, SOMO Representing 474 Myanmar CSOs vs. Telenor ASA, 27 July 2021. 227 OECD Watch, SOMO Representing 474 Myanmar CSOs vs. Telenor ASA. 228 Telenor, Updates from Telenor Group on Developments in Myanmar Since 1 February 2021. 226 51