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ARTICLE 19 Myanmar Myanmar provides an important example of why discussions about the roles of foreign tech companies must also cover surveillance and spyware companies, as these industries operate secretively and are much harder to influence via public pressure campaigns. However, Myanmar watchdog groups have actively tried to pressure them.195 Case study: Platform reactions to military content after the 2021 coup Several tech companies announced measures to remove military content from their platforms following the 2021 coup. Shortly after the coup, Meta announced that it would reduce the distribution of content from military-run channels which shared disinformation. Then, on 24 February 2021, it banned all military and military-controlled accounts from Facebook and Instagram, along with ads from military-linked businesses. It cited the military’s history of severe human rights abuses and repeated violations of platform policies, as well as ongoing violations, the risk of future violence, and the increased risk since the coup that online threats would lead to offline harm.196 Several weeks later, Meta announced a specific policy on removing posts which praised or supported violence by Myanmar security forces against protesters, and in December 2021, it banned military-linked businesses from the platform.197 With the military losing easy access to Facebook, it tried moving to other platforms, including YouTube, VK, and TikTok. Following Meta’s lead, YouTube removed 5 of the military-run television networks in early March 2021. However, it has not publicly announced Myanmarspecific actions since then, and digital rights activists suggest that it has done little in practice.198 TikTok was slower to respond initially and was subject to criticism for hosting military propaganda, including of soldiers making violent threats and brandishing weapons.199 The Myanmar ICT for Development Organisation (MIDO) documented more than 800 promilitary videos threatening protesters as of early March 2021.200 In response to this study and other public criticism, TikTok acknowledged that it had been slow to act but claimed it ____________________________________________ 195 See, for example, Justice for Myanmar, Tools of Digital Repression, 2 March 2021; Burma Campaign UK, The Dirty List, August 2023. 196 R. Frankel, An Update. 197 R. Frankel, An Update. 198 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2023: Myanmar (citing discussions with digital rights defenders). 199 International Crisis Group, Myanmar’s Military, p. 22. 200 Reuters, ‘I Will Shoot Whoever I See’: Myanmar Soldiers Use TikTok to Threaten Protesters, 4 March 2021. 47

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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