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China ARTICLE 19 publication or instant messaging services to authenticate users with real identity information. They are supposed to review this information to check for certain prohibited conduct, including posting illegal or negative content as specified in the Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem, and to deny service to those found to be in breach. They must also publicly display the location of users’ IP addresses. China’s legal framework imposes a direct obligation on tech companies to censor content and requires companies to proactively screen for vaguely defined categories of harmful content. This does not align with human rights standards. The categories of prohibited content are defined far too broadly to align with the ‘provided by law’ requirement, and many ban legitimate content. China’s security laws also require companies to cooperate in a surveillance regime which lacks procedural safeguards and independent oversight and review. While some of its data protection rules require private actors to protect privacy, they also enable state access to that data and lack any protection against misuse of such data by the state. Overall, platforms operating in China will almost certainly be asked to assist in actions which violate human rights law. Tech company responses China’s highly controlled digital landscape and recent hostility towards large tech companies means that relatively few of the major Western tech companies remain in the Chinese market. Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have been blocked in China since 2009. 63 Some tech companies, after attempting to engage with the potentially lucrative Chinese market, have exited partially or fully because of the difficult regulatory and political context. The extent to which human rights rather than business concerns drive these exit decisions is not always clear. For example, LinkedIn was able to enter the Chinese market because it censored politically sensitive content and agreed to 2 local firms having an ownership stake.64 By 2021, it was the only major Western social media platform left in the country and was subject to growing pressure to increase its content censorship. It withdrew its main platform that year, citing the challenging regulatory and operational environment.65 Similarly, Google originally agreed to comply with Chinese censorship demands when it launched in China in 2006. In 2010, it was subject to a highly sophisticated hack of Chinese origins, seemingly aimed at accessing the email accounts of Chinese activists. Google then announced that it would no longer accede to censorship demands and relocated its Chinese ____________________________________________ A. Abkowitz, D. Seetharaman, and E. Dou, Facebook Is Trying Everything to Re-Enter China – and It’s Not Working, Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2017; L. Hornby and Y. Le, China to Require Internet Domain Name Registration, Reuters, 22 December 2009. 64 P. Mozur, LinkedIn Said It Would Censor in China: Now That It Is, Some Users Are Unhappy, Wall Street Journal (blog), 4 June 2014; P. Mozur and V. Goe, To Reach China, LinkedIn Plays by Local Rules, New York Times, 5 October 2014. 65 P. Mozur, R. Zhong, and S. Lohr, China Punishes Microsoft’s LinkedIn Over Lax Censorship, New York Times, 18 March 2021; L. McLellan, The Last US-Owned Social Media Platform in China Is Closing, Quartz, 14 October 2021. 63 23

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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