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China ARTICLE 19 In addition to its censorship system, China controls the information landscape by promoting pro-government or approved content online. This is done partly via government employees generating mass posts as additional part-time work, but Chinese propaganda departments and individual government agencies also regularly hire private companies to conduct public opinion monitoring and to support influence operations.37 Legal obligations on tech companies China’s censorship system functions in part by imposing censorship obligations on tech companies. Companies are expected to impose not only the content prohibitions contained in a range of laws and regulations, but also non-codified political guidelines.38 China typically enacts laws with intentionally vague or flexible provisions, supplemented by numerous regulations or other directives. This creates a complex and sometimes arbitrary regulatory environment. The remainder of this section outlines some of the most important laws and regulations, but given the complexity of this legal landscape, it is certainly not a comprehensive review. One of the most important foundational laws for China’s current internet regulation is the Cybersecurity Law 2017.39 Article 9 imposes a very general obligation on network operators to follow laws and regulations, respect social morality, be credible, accept supervision from the government and the public, and bear social responsibility. Article 47 imposes a vague obligation on network operators to strengthen the management of information published by users, and on discovery of prohibited information, ‘immediately’ stop its dissemination through actions such as deleting it or reporting it. The Cybersecurity Law refers to the idea of ‘critical information infrastructure operators’ (CIIOs), but this is not defined clearly. CIIOs can include companies in the information services and telecommunications sectors, but 2021 regulations require precise rules on this to be formulated by relevant industry-specific departments.40 In practice, it appears that a company receives a notice if it is deemed to be a CIIO.41 ____________________________________________ 37 G. King, J. Pan, and M.E. Roberts, How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument, American Political Science Review, 111:3 (2017), pp. 484–501; J. Batke and M. Ohlberg, Message Control, China File, 20 December 2020. 38 J. Knockel, K. Kato, and E. Dirks, Missing Links: A Comparison of Search Censorship in China, The Citizen Lab, 26 April 2023. 39 For an unofficial English translation, see R. Creemers, P. Triolo, and G. Webster, Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Effective June 1, 2017), New America, 29 June 2018. 40 Creemers, Triolo, and Webster, Translation: Cybersecurity Law. 41 A. Gamvros and L. Wang, ‘Am I A CII Operator?’ New Regulation Provides More Clarity, Norton Rose Fulbright, 18 August 2021. 19

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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Information Operation
Internet Restrictions

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Article 19

Date Published: Oct 5, 2024

Abstract: In this report, ARTICLE 19 reviews the human rights context and responsibilities of tech companies operating in 3 authoritarian countries in Asia, namely China, Myanmar, and Vietnam. It focuses on the rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and the manner in which authoritarian states directly or indirectly expect companies to assist them in censoring content, promoting propaganda, accessing user data, and engaging in surveillance. While these are undoubtedly highly challenging contexts, companies have not sufficiently prioritised protecting human rights in their policies and actions. States are the primary duty bearers under international human rights law, but companies also have human rights responsibilities, as outlined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Even if domestic law or circumstances make it impossible for companies to fully meet their human rights responsibilities, they should take action so as to respect human rights standards to the greatest extent possible. Tech companies should not merely reference local law as an excuse for collaborating in rights violations. They should take steps such as those detailed in this report, like adopting appropriate policies, asking governments to justify content removal requests clearly and specifically, and reporting transparently on their compliance with government demands. For each country, we survey the country context and provide an overview of legal obligations which companies operate under that are problematic from the perspective of international human rights law and that may, as a result, put pressure on companies to become complicit in violations of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. We then explore how Western tech companies operating in these countries, many of which have explicitly stated their commitment to respecting freedom of expression and privacy, have responded to these legal obligations and to other government expectations that they will cooperate in violations of these rights.

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Engaging tech for internet freedom in authoritarian countries

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