M.MAS 1/12/17 example, discussed their reasons for intervening in terms of the potential damage to either their own community or to the prestige of their own religion. Indeed, this motivation was an important counter argument in their efforts to prevent violence; it helped convince people to assist in de-escalation or not engage in activities that could further inflame communal tensions. However, the twin to this argument is that it ceases to function where the escalation of violence poses no threat to the protagonists’ own community. In Case Study 2, for example, it may have been possible to dissuade a call for revenge on the basis of concern for subsequent repercussions. But concern for such repercussions can do little to militate against other forms of violence. The impact of systemic discrimination and disenfranchisement can be just as devastating as a riot, but it does not pose the same risk of fire that spreads beyond the homes of those initially targeted. Similarly, insofar as religious framings that attribute negative characteristics to all followers of Islam remain in wide circulation, the risk of escalation will also persist. Recognition of this is particularly relevant in light of new violence in parts of Rakhine State since October 2016. Religious framings will be effective ways for instigators to brand Muslims in other parts of Myanmar as extremists by virtue of their religion and work to escalate violence as an extension of anti-terrorism operations in Rakhine State. The competing arguments discussed in this paper may not effectively counter such claims. We do not raise these concerns as criticism of the ways in which escalating violence was countered and avoided in these four cases. Those involved seem to have made the best of difficult situations. Their actions were necessary—we just mean to say that they are not alone sufficient. They may prevent riots, but the apparent quiet that follows is not peace. To be sure, some of these cases illustrate dynamics that helped to prevent escalating violence but could also undergird work to promote peace. These include the arguments about shared local civic identity, for example, as seen in Case Study 1; shared forms of vulnerability born from poverty, as seen in case studies 2 and 3; or common experiences of hardship and cooperation to surmount difficulties or respond to local crises, as seen in Case Study 4. These arguments are born from lived experiences in Myanmar. They are in circulation and can help to promote peace, in the form of maintaining and encouraging forms of coexistence and solidarity that already exist. We should do our best to support them. 22/24