M.MAS 1/12/17 people in power. Some versions of the narrative speculate (or claim) that religious identities, insecurities and fears are being used as a way of undermining the NLD. One interviewee in Case Study 1 explained that, since 2013, particularly with the student protests (that began in late 2014), it has become more apparent to people that conflicts have an element of political manipulation: “When there was a political conflict…at first people only focused on the religious conflict. After the student protest, [these religious conflicts] appeared to be tricks of the military government. If we compare the current situation and the situation in the past, [people’s] views are changing.” 54 Another interviewee related similar sentiments regarding instigation in the lead-up to the 2015 election, arguing that those people were attempting to cause problems for the election, but since local people wanted the election to go ahead, they were willing to work together to avoid conflict: “This problem happened before the election, so people have started to understand the situation. They [the local people] didn’t want the election to be postponed, so people used election-related language to prevent the conflict.” 55 Recognizing other types of violence Each of the four cases discussed in this paper failed to escalate into wider violence and reflecting on how this came to pass has been instructive for us. Yet at the same time, some of the factors that interviewees believed had helped to avoid riotous violence have negative aspects that must also be considered. There is much positive to take away from the four “negative cases” studied here, but we feel compelled to close with three concerns that might dampen our optimism. First, the unstated premise lurking under the analysis by some interviewees is that culpability for violence centres on the actions of the group that is a minority in terms of demography as well as political power. One woman in Case Study 4, for example, explained the value of what she saw as the non-confrontational behaviour of Muslims in her area: “They just live peacefully by themselves and they controlled themselves. And they do not live very proudly.” 56 A Buddhist man who described the meeting in Case Study 1 that seems to have dissipated religious tensions, spoke about the conduct of Muslim participants in the following way: “The Muslim group [at the meeting] was the minority and they apologized to other religious groups. Even if other factors stimulated the rumours, they also apologized for that. Whatever it was, they didn’t put themselves on the same level with the other groups, and they stepped down and apologized to others, to have a better relationship with other groups and show respect to all.” 57 This does not mean that our interviewees’ causal accounts were incorrect; it does seem clear that the incidents in these places did not escalate in part due to the deferential and submissive actions of Muslim leaders. It also appears to have been a wise strategy—and perhaps the only option—for non-Buddhists seeking to avoid worsening an already tense situation. But our concern is with the degree to which it implies that, if the incidents had escalated, the blame would have then rested with the Muslim minorities involved. While recognizing that Muslims can and have been antagonists, such an assessment is problematic because it suggests that the central precondition for peace is that Muslim populations in Myanmar keep quiet. This shifts focus away from any others who are involved in violence, including those who encourage and enact it. An interviewee in Case Study 4, for example, illustrates how this can play out even between friends: “Muslims [here] are very social. They do not live isolated [from others]. You can make jokes with them about eating pork.” 58 Willingness to allow joking about one’s religious 54 Female, 25 years old, Muslim. Male, 25 years old, Buddhist. 56 Female, 31 years old, Christian. 57 Male, 35 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 58 Female, 31 years old, Christian. 55 20/24