M.MAS 1/12/17 groups were competing over different ends and interests. Even when the details of these contests were not clearly apparent, the conflict was nonetheless visible. Sometimes, these contests resulted in awful violence. Sometimes, they did not. Where such violence did occur, in other words, it was an achievement in the non-evaluative sense used by Mike McGovern. Large-scale violence does not simply happen, McGovern has argued. It takes work, by individuals and groups, work that does not always live up to the actors’ intentions. Understanding such failed attempts has as much to teach us as those which come to terrible realization. 8 Or, as Varshney has argued: “Until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict.”9 We agree. This paper therefore examines four cases in which localized—sometimes even individual—conflicts seemed poised to escalate into larger conflagrations but then did not do so. Given that other situations in Myanmar of apparently similar character have resulted in significant instances of collective violence, we ask: why did these four cases fail to produce similar results? The first section of the paper briefly introduces the methodology and theoretical orientation of this research. The next section details the four case studies. In each case study, we summarize events as best we understand them and then present some of the analyses provided in interviews with individuals who were directly involved. In the final section of the paper, we offer four sets of conclusions that we hope will be useful for those interested in preventing collective violence in Myanmar. Methodology Along with McGovern and Varshney, there is a small but robust literature from those seeking to understand collective violence by focusing on failed attempts and “negative cases.”10 A central insight from this literature is that it is not sufficient to explain—let alone predict—violence by attending only to the presence or absence of phenomena identified as warning signs, triggers, and root causes. These frameworks are helpful as tools for research and early warning as well as for engaging people in nonconfrontational ways about the potential for violence in their communities. But the scholarly literature on negative cases also demonstrates that there will be many situations in which all the warning signs will be present and yet the most feared scenarios do not arise. As Scott Straus puts it, “One result is a frequency mismatch: most theory posits causal factors that are much more common than the outcome.” 11 8 Mike McGovern, Making War in Cote d’Ivoire (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2011), 173. Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 6. 10 “Negative” in the sense that the expected results did not eventuate, where the preconditions for collective violence existed but where such violence did not occur (Straus 2012, 356). 11 Scott Straus, “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (June 2012): 343, doi:10.1017/S1537592712000709. For other studies of negative cases and attempts to theorize why violence does not occur in situations where many theories would expect it, see Jonathan Leader Maynard, “Preventing Mass Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions,” Politics and Governance 3, no. 3 (October 27, 2015): 67, doi:10.17645/pag.v3i3.320; Stephen McLoughlin, “Understanding Mass Atrocity Prevention during Periods of Democratic Transition,” Politics and Governance 3, no. 3 (October 27, 2015): 27, doi:10.17645/pag.v3i3.318; Meghan Foster Lynch, “Civilian Agency in Times of Crisis: Lessons from Burundi,” in The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents, ed. Steve J. Stern and Scott Straus (University of Wisconsin Pres, 2014), 81–106; Stephen McLoughlin, “Reconceptualizing Mass Atrocity Prevention: Understanding Risk and Resilience in Zambia,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 27, no. 4 (March 28, 2014): 427–41, doi:10.1007/s10767-014-9175-x; Stephen McLoughlin, “Rethinking the Structural Prevention of Mass Atrocities,” Global Responsibility to Protect 6, no. 4 (November 27, 2014): 407–29, doi:10.1163/1875984X-00604004; Jeremy Allouche and Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi, “The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire,” IDS Bulletin 44, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 72–86, doi:10.1111/1759-5436.12008; Bert Ingelaere et al., Genocide, Risk and Resilience: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer, 2013); Straus, “Retreating from the Brink.” 9 3/24