M.MAS 1/12/17 intentions, they played central roles in driving forward situations that made others in the affected areas feel seriously afraid of violent escalation. Second, whatever ends were sought by those driving the situation in each case towards violence, their failure to achieve these ends was no accident. It took work, on the part of civil society and religious leaders, along with individual active citizens, who were important for efforts to de-escalate each of these situations. The cases considered here did not necessarily include previously-existing interfaith or peacebuilding groups, or at least not that self-identified as such. Instead, the common trait of the individuals involved is that they had built up trust and credibility in communities and with local authorities through previous activities that did not relate to promoting peace or inter-faith harmony. But this previous work enabled them to counsel against violence, meditate disputes, and act as trusted interlocutors in situations where communities either were not directly communicating with one another or when they would not have been inclined to believe statements from the other community. In Case Study 1, for example, the monk who offered support—in the form of revenge—may not have been relied upon because the nationalist monks did not necessarily have a good reputation in the neighbourhood; U Wirathu had apparently been unhelpful when the squatters had turned to him for aid during a previous struggle with police who were trying to push them off their land. The squatters’ advocate pointed to this experience when she explained why she turned to other civil society leaders for advice rather than the monk. In Case Study 3, the civil society leader who navigated the bureaucratic and social channels necessary to facilitate negotiations was only able to do so because he had already built connections and established himself as working for the betterment of the area. While these cases did not include explicitly interfaith groups, they did involve a diversity of actors from different religious communities working together. This dynamic should be distinguished from explicitly “interfaith” organizing, which, at least in Myanmar, has tended to focus on mutual understanding of each other’s religious beliefs and practices. In these four cases, it was more often a different type of mutual interest that brought people together across religious lines to discuss a dispute. In Case Study 1, for example, it was sharing water from a communal well. In Case Study 3, it appears clear that the civil society leader who played a crucial role in negotiations was well connected because he had done other forms of social welfare and relief work in the area. Similarly, in Case Study 4, the young man who negotiated on behalf of the Muslim community had developed relationships with non-Muslim community members and civil society leaders via his social development and relief activities. It is also essential to recognize that, even in these situations of heightened tension and distrust, Buddhists and Muslims in diverse contexts were able to hold discussions and mediate potential conflicts. Highlighting this fact directly challenges common perceptions of intractable and long-standing antagonism between religious groups in Myanmar, although it does also highlight the further difficulties posed by extended geographic and social separation of religious communities, such as exists in parts of Rakhine State at the moment. The CSOs and individuals that played key roles in calming, mediating, or bringing together opposed groups did not necessarily identify as “peace-builders,” but they did appear to play critical roles in deescalating conflict and avoiding violence. In some cases, they had to do this when the state was not fulfilling its obligations, or when state officials or institutions were acting in ways that exacerbated the tensions. In Case Study 1, the police were seen to play a positive role in encouraging Muslims to disband night-time security patrols that might have escalated fears of a pre-emptive strike. However, interviewees said that the Special Branch was unresponsive to people’s concerns about an imminent attack by Buddhists on Muslims. Similarly, in Case Study 3, the move by the military to declare martial law (or impose restrictions on movement) seemed to create additional worries for the local community regarding their ability to conduct business and get sufficient food. While much more research is needed into the role of state officials in cases of violence between religious groups, these examples make clear that both action and inaction by state authorities are crucial in either supporting or undermining the efforts of those who seek to make peace at a local level. 16/24