C5: အင်တာနက် လFပ်ေဆာင်မ,များအား အစိးF ရမ4 ေစာင့D် ကည့ ြ် ခင်းသည် သံးF စွသ ဲ မ N ျား၏ ပFဂိpMလ်ဆင Fိ ရ ် ာလွတလ ် ပ် မ,Yင 4 ့် ၁ မ4တ ် အချက်အလက်လြံF ခံMမ, အခွငအ ့် ေရး (privacy)ကိF ချိMးေဖာက်ပါသလား။ (၀-၆ မ4တ)် C5: Does state surveillance of internet activities infringe on users’ right to privacy? (0–6 points) The military’s online surveillance and interception has grown since the beginning of the coup, dovetailing with its comprehensive offline capacity. Immediately after the coup began, the military unlawfully suspended parts of the Law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens, including its modest safeguards against warrantless surveillance and interception of private messages.282 The draft Cyber Security Law would, if adopted, strip away almost all privacy protections and require all data to be stored on devices and servers designated by and accessible to the military without any form of oversight (see C2).283 Although the draft has not yet been enacted, the military unilaterally amended the Electronic Transactions Law in February 2021 by adding some of the same problematic provisions included in an earlier draft of the Cyber Security Law. For instance, the revised law grants the authorities broad powers to inspect any device on vague bases such as “misuse.”284 According to a May 2021 Reuters report, former military officials pressured providers in late 2020 to install interception technology that would enable the military to view texts and emails, listen to phone calls, and locate users without assistance or approval.285 Some observers believed that the technology was not yet fully proactive but rather relied on the military to actively identify what it wanted to monitor.286 The military’s Public Relations and Information Production Unit, known as the Ka Ka Com, reportedly had a network of teams involving hundreds of soldiers nationwide responsible for identifying suspects and networks online, and then infiltrating them;287 military surveillance networks also included information with data from the devices of captured detainees,288 1 and from security cameras equipped with facialrecognition technology.289 The military also used soldiers to conduct physical surveillance of devices through random spot-checks and fixed checkpoints, looking for censorship circumvention tools or politically sensitive content in photo albums, messages, and posted on social media.290 Forensic search technology was reportedly active in Myanmar prior to the coup: Police have used products from the Israeli company Cellebrite since 2016.291 The malware product FinSpy was reportedly in operation in Myanmar in 2019.292 Before the coup, the NLD government had already invested in acquiring interception capacity, including by ordering service providers to install the technology that the military later activated after the coup began.293 The NLD government spent $4.8 million on technology,294 allocated to the Social Media Monitoring Team (SMMT),295 a body established under the MoTC.296 The NLD government argued that the SMMT was necessary to counter individuals causing “instability” online, including through hate speech and defamation.297 Little was known about the SMMT’s operations or whether there was any oversight,298 but civil society assumes that it is now being used by the military.299 The SMMT spent its budget on tools from vendors based in Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Israel, among others.300 Purchases included MacQuisition forensic software, which can extract data from Apple computers; tools that can extract deleted content from mobile devices; and additional technology for determining the home addresses of online critics. ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ