B8: အထNးသြဖင့် Yိင F င ် ေ ံ ရးY4င ့် လNမ,ေရးကိစရ } ပ် များY4င ့် ပတ်သက်၍ အသံးF ြပMသNများ၏ လ,ပ်34ားေဆာင်ရွက်ြခင်း၊ အစFအဖွဲU ၂ မ4တ ် B8: Do conditions impede users’ ability to mobilize, form communities, and campaign, particularly on political and social issues? (0–6 points) 2 တည်ေထာင်ြခင်း စည်း~ံF းလ,Uေ ံ ဆာ်ြခင်း စသည့်တ ိF လF ိF စ ် မ ွ ်းကိF အေြခအေနအရပ် ရပ် က တားဆီးေနပါသလား။ (၀-၆ မ4တ)် ့ ပ်Yင Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the military’s repression has sharply curtailed online organizing and has impeded mobilization within Myanmar, though some small-scale digital activism persists. The military continued to impede the public’s ability to associate or assemble online throughout the coverage period.193 The military’s blunt-force tactics of curtailing internet access (see A3) and blocking access to tools like Facebook and WhatsApp (see B1) were used repeatedly to prevent mobilization and armed resistance.194 The military also used interception systems and social media surveillance to identify and locate political and community leaders (see C5). People participating in antimilitary activities or associating themselves with groups like the CDM or the National Unity Government (NUG), including online, face serious risks of extrajudicial violence and imprisonment if identified and caught (see C3 and C7).195 The military also announced it was “systematically scrutinizing” other civil society organizations in March 2022, further narrowing the space for community formation.196 The military has forced much of civil society into hiding, going into exile, shifting their focus to less politically sensitive topics, shutting down, or publicly accepting the legitimacy of the coup.197 For example, of the four organizations that led the Myanmar Digital Rights Forum—an annual discussion for stakeholders in civil society, business, and technology—at least one had shut down, a second stopped working on digital rights, and the director of a third, Vicky Bowman, was imprisoned in September 2022, after the coverage period.198 Civil society–organized online events were rarely held for fear of military reprisal.199 The military also attempted to undermine civil society groups’ operations and funding.200 Despite these restrictions, people continued to use online tools to organize and share information whenever possible. The CDM was launched on Facebook the day after the coup started201 and participants continued to mobilize during the coverage period.202 The military’s political opposition, which launched within days of the February 2021 coup,203 has coalesced into the NUG, a resistance movement that appeared to rely heavily on its online presence during the coverage period.204 Some small-scale protests persist: In early 2022, some shop owners closed down their establishments in a general strike against the coup, with people mobilizing online to show support; at least 193 people were subsequently detained, including people who supported the strike on social media (see C3).205 Users have tried a range of tactics to circumvent the military’s blocking efforts; VPNs and secure communications tools have become widespread. One secure communications app, Bridgify, was downloaded over a million times in Myanmar within two days of the coup.206 The circumvention app Psiphon was downloaded by nearly two million users during the same period.207 VPN usage was 7,200 percent higher by the end of February 4, 2021, than it was a week before, according to industry monitor Top10VPN; VPN usage continued to climb during the coverage period.208 The NLD government also targeted assembly and association rights before the coup, with protesters regularly facing arrest.209 Dozens of people were arrested during 2020 for participating in offline protests against internet shutdowns and many later received prison terms.210 Proposed amendments to the outdated legal framework were insufficient.211 ် ပ်မ/ - ြမန်မာ2ိင 4 င ် ံ Free Expression Myanmar (FEM) and Freedom House - Freedom of the Net: Myanmar - အင်တာနက်ေပ*တွင် လွတလ